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i 
Abstract 
In spite of the technological advancement and progress of liberalism, religion has 
remained an essential aspect of individual and national life in many countries. In many 
societies, religion has manifested elements of extremism, which ultimately perpetuates 
violence and destruction. This radical religious phenomenon is much predominant in the 
Southeast and South Asian region, including the country known as Myanmar. Myanmar 
has become a classic example of the religious fusion of politics and social life. The 
hybrid form of emerging democratic tenets, albeit under military sponsorship in 
Myanmar, provides a breeding ground for religious nationalism, with dire consequences 
for religious minorities. Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar has adopted a virulent anti-
Muslim narrative in particular and intolerance and hate towards the Muslim minority 
Rohingyas living in Rakhine state in particular. From August 2017, communal violence 
to date approximately 600,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar and became refugees in 
neighboring Bangladesh. The catastrophic humanitarian disaster that emanates through 
the Rohingya crisis poses a threat to regional security and therefore requires the 
immediate attention of the global community to stop further loss of lives and destruction. 
The impacts of the Rohingya conflict are not confined within the boundaries of 
Myanmar, but the conflict also impacts its neighboring Southeast Asian countries. This 
thesis emphasizes on the dangers of religious xenophobia as well as the use and 
explanation of faith for political and nationalistic causes. The paper also evaluates the 
role of Myanmar military in the socio-political and economic context to determine their 
involvement in setting the platform for the rise of Buddhist nationalism. The thesis argues 
that the culture of minority oppression and systemic discrimination against religious 
 
 
ii 
minority groups such as the Rohingya not only jeopardizes the county's democratic 
credentials and vision but also carries grave implications for Southeast Asia, one of the 
most volatile regions in the world. 
Keywords: religious nationalism, Rohingya, Buddhism, violence, discrimination, 
ethnic cleansing, ethnic conflict, refugee, human rights. 
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The Rise of Mono Ethnic Religious Nationalism in Myanmar and its Impacts on the 
Security Situation of the South Asian Region 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Deciding on the Topic 
In August 2017, while I was preparing to move to the USA for a Master’s degree 
in conflict resolution, I witnessed the desperate journey of the Muslim minority 
Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh and other neighboring countries. It was wave 
after wave of hundreds of thousands of frightened people, including women, children, 
and the elderly, all fleeing the instability. I was watching TV news and following social 
media accounts, which highlighted the suffering of the Rohingyas: the mass killings, 
rape, the setting ablaze of houses, and eviction of people from their homeland. To learn 
more about the situation, I traveled to the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh, where 
refugee camps had been established by the Bangladesh government and aid agencies for 
the Rohingya refugees. There I heard the sad stories of the victims and their 
sufferings. However, this was not the first time I became a witness to such a tragic event 
involving the same set of people. In both 2012 and 2016, I also witnessed the forced 
displacement of thousands of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh, following yet 
another round of communal violence. The horror stories and the sufferings recounted by 
the refugees caught my attention and interest. I was moved by two questions: Why are the 
Rohingyas unable to lead a life like other Myanmar citizens in their homeland? And why 
are they often the subject of violence and forced eviction?   
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After moving to Portland State University, USA, to pursue my graduate degree, I 
regularly monitored the Myanmar Rohingya issue, which has turned out to be one of the 
most severe humanitarian catastrophes in the world. The spillover effects of the crisis 
started impacting other Southeast and South Asian countries, such as Bangladesh, India, 
Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. The killing and eviction of the Muslim minority 
Rohingyas in Myanmar and the influx of the refugees in neighboring countries has 
deteriorated the security situation in the South Asian region. The recent clash between the 
Buddhists and the Muslims and bomb blasts in churches and hotels in Sri Lanka and the 
xenophobic rise of Hindu Nationalism in India should not be considered as isolated 
incidents. The rise of religious xenophobia in Myanmar has impacted the socio-political 
situations of her neighboring countries also, which made me very concerned about the 
further deterioration of the regional stability of the South Asian region. From my 
previous experience as a United Nations (UN) peacekeeper in conflict zones like Liberia, 
I can relate the security challenges posed by mass displacement of peoples. My recent 
visits to refugee camps in Bangladesh in August 2019 further affirmed my suspicion that 
the Rohingya issue has already turned to a severe humanitarian crisis and started posing a 
substantial security threat to the South Asian region as well as to global peace. The rise of 
communal tension will degrade human rights and social values domestically and will 
pose serious threats to the security and social stability of Myanmar and its neighbors. 
Poor socio-economic conditions in the South Asian region have created a favorable 
ground for the rise of religious nationalism. Religion and politics are at the heart of the 
crisis unfolding in this region and Myanmar in particular.  
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In spite of the technological advancement and progress of liberalism, religion has 
remained an important aspect of individual and national life in many parts of the world. 
Religion not only influences personal life but also shapes the politics and culture of many 
nations. In some parts of the world, religion fuses with extremism, which ultimately 
perpetuates violence and destruction. This type of radical religious phenomenon is 
prevalent in the Southeast Asian region. Myanmar has become a classic example of 
religious fusion with politics and social life. The hybrid form of democracy under the 
military sponsorship in the country once knows as Burma provides a breeding ground for 
religious nationalism. The Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar has adopted an anti-Muslim 
narrative to generate intolerance and hate towards the Muslim minorities in the Rakhine 
state, on the western coast of Myanmar. 
  The UN designates the Rohingyas as ‘the world’s most persecuted ethnic group.' 
Since the start of the most recent communal violence in August 2017, approximately 
600,000 Rohingya have been registered as refugees into Bangladesh (United Nations 
Human Rights Council, 2018). They are fleeing a high level of violence directed at them 
by extremists from the Buddhist majority. Such hatred and mistrust have sharply divided 
the Myanmar society, and the Rohingyas have become vulnerable to systematic 
discrimination and socio-economic exclusion, including deprivation of basic human 
rights, such as education, healthcare, and freedom of expression. Such a culture of 
minority oppression and systematic discrimination has already jeopardized the 
democratic vision of Myanmar.  
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The impacts of the Rohingya crisis are not only confined within the boundary of 
Myanmar, but the conflict also continues to impact its neighboring countries. Any kind of 
instability caused by religious tensions in the South Asian region needs to be addressed 
immediately. Because due to poor socio-economic conditions, overpopulation, absence of 
the rule of law, and fragile social service structures, the region is not capable of dealing 
with a large scale humanitarian disaster over a sustained period. Also, the Myanmar 
incident is not an isolated incident. Therefore, there is a need to understand the global 
dimension of religious nationalism and communal violence in the region and other parts 
of the world as a whole. 
In light of the above, the prevailing humanitarian crisis that emanates from the 
rise of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar provides a unique opportunity for 
policymakers, scholars, and conflict resolution practitioners to examine and research the 
ongoing situations to enrich the knowledge of social studies. The study of the Rohingya 
crisis may help social scientists to highlight the root causes of protracted conflicts and the 
way forward that might be helpful for the local and international communities to support 
the resolution of religious conflicts around the world.    
This paper focuses on the xenophobic rise in Myanmar, a country dominated by a 
religion often perceived as peaceful. Of equal interest to the analysis in this paper are the 
general characteristics of any nationalist entity and how Buddhist extremist groups in 
Myanmar confirm these characteristics by using religion as a tool for implementing 
nationalistic and political agendas. Moreover, the thesis not only focuses on the influence 
of religious faith in the anti-Muslim narrative but also investigates the role of the 
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government and the Myanmar military in the socio-political and economic context of 
Myanmar. Due to the escalation of violence and massive human rights violations that 
have engulfed the security situation in the South Asian region, the paper further analyzes 
the spillover effects of the Rohingya crisis on Myanmar’s neighboring countries and its 
ultimate impacts on the region.  
The answers to the research questions posed in this thesis help to determine and 
eliminate the root causes of the xenophobic rise in the South Asian region, and contribute 
in curbing the rise of religious nationalism in the region. The study throws light on core 
issues that are driving the communal conflict as well as proffers solution to redressing the 
emerging challenges. 
1.2 Research Question 
The research question that guides the present thesis includes the following: What are 
the factors responsible for the rising communal tension between the Buddhist majority 
and the Muslim minorities in Myanmar? The research question entails several sub-
questions, which are: 
 What internal dynamics between the Buddhists and the Rohingyas in Myanmar 
have played an essential role in leading to ongoing violence against the Muslim 
minority Rohingyas?  
 What is the existing relationship between the government, the military, the 
Buddhists, and the Rohingyas? How has the living conditions of the Rohingyas 
changed between the period of democratic rule and that of the military rule?  
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 What has been the traditional role of Buddhism as a peaceful religion, and has it 
been changed under prevailing conditions in Myanmar? 
 Has the Rohingya issue become part of party politics competing for power?  
 Are there any influences of existing global terrorism on the rise of xenophobia in 
Myanmar?    
 How does the Rohingya crisis impact the security situation in the Southeast and 
South Asian region? To what extent has the dynamic of the relationship between 
the Buddhist majority and Rohingya Muslim minorities in Myanmar impacted the 
regional stability of South Asia?  
 Is there a prospect of de-escalating the Myanmar Rohingya conflict through the 
actions of domestic and international actors?   
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
The approach of this thesis focuses on qualitative content analysis, concentrating 
on key ‘influencers’ including government officials, political leaders, academics, 
religious figures, the press, social media, and religious charters. At the very outset, this 
paper analyzes the context of the ongoing Rohingya crisis to construct an abstract outline 
of the inter-communal relationship in this region; successively, it focuses on the religious 
aspects of the conflict. I have used qualitative methodology to find the answers to 
questions relating to the rise of religious nationalism, and whether or not Buddhism is 
radicalized in Myanmar, and if so, why? Qualitative research methods are used to 
evaluate the historical perspectives and the present context of Myanmar in order to 
analyze the factors that favored the rise of religious nationalism in Myanmar. It also helps 
to investigate the discrepancies of Buddhist teachings with its existing practices and to 
identify the deviations from the traditional role of Buddhism in Myanmar society. For a 
comprehensive study of religious nationalism, this thesis examines three aspects of 
Buddhism in Myanmar. First, the level of influence Buddhism has over Myanmar society 
and the sources of such influences, second, when and how the traditional role of 
Buddhism changed to nationalist form and third, under which circumstances the Buddhist 
philosophy and symbols used for the idealization of Myanmar nationalism. This paper 
also intends to examine the role of the military in the socio-economic and political sphere 
of Myanmar, through analyzing the prevailing governance system, economic structure, 
different policies, and media reports.  
  Content analysis of existing literature (books, articles, journals, social media, 
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news contents, and government documents) both from Myanmar and Bangladesh are also 
relevant sources for this academic project. The victims' perspectives have been brought 
out through interviews of the Rohingya communities recently moved to Portland and the 
Rohingyas, who had been living in Portland. To understand the prevailing sociopolitical 
environment of Myanmar, the essence of the lived experiences of the citizens would be 
useful.  A series of onsite interviews conducted with the Rohingyas accommodated in the 
refugee camps in Bangladesh, the Border Guard members of Bangladesh, as well as the 
religious leaders of the Muslim and Buddhist communities living in the nearby towns of 
Myanmar and Bangladesh border. Interviews with the staff of various international 
humanitarian agencies, working in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, had been conducted 
to understand the present state of the Rohingyas. 
The present research paper focuses on the nationalist narrative of Myanmar 
society under the prolonged military rule, the influence of Buddhism on the socio-
political narrative, and how these two factors contributed to rising Buddhist nationalism 
in Myanmar. It examines the role of the Myanmar military in the socio-political and 
economic affairs, especially in relation to the Rohingya issues and the military’s 
relationship with the Buddhist and the Muslim communities. This paper also examines 
the relationship between the military and the Rohingyas in order to determine if the 
Rohingyas are targeted for oppression and violence during the military rule only, or 
whether they were also subject to oppression by other regimes. Such a comparison of the 
living standards of the Rohingyas for the last few decades helps to understand whether or 
not the Rohingyas experienced a greater level of oppression, violence, and systemic 
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discrimination during the successive military governments since the independence. The 
research paper goes further, identifying the root causes of the conflict, which gave rise to 
Buddhist nationalism and the anti-Muslim narrative in Myanmar. This research diagnoses 
the Rohingya crisis as a case study to examine the nature and extent of religious 
nationalism and its root causes, and impacts created over the regional security. 
To understand the impacts of the xenophobic rise in Myanmar and following in 
Sri Lanka and India and its spillover impacts on the security situation in South Asia, the 
political conditions in these neighboring countries have been monitored and evaluated 
through analyzing the recent articles and media reports on the security situation of South 
Asia.  
2.1 Thesis Design  
  The thesis is primarily designed to address the main research question and all the 
sub-questions related to it. The paper gives a brief introduction about the Rohingya crisis, 
followed by a factual presentation of the socio-political, economic, and religious culture 
of Myanmar for easy comprehension of the prevailing situation.  As the Rohingya crisis 
is complex and linked to deep socio-political, historical, economic, and cultural roots, it 
is difficult to draw a specific timeline that shaped the extent of the Rohingya crisis. 
However, for progressive and practical research purposes, a particular timeline needs to 
be drawn, and the start of colonial rule in Myanmar seems to be a logical event to start 
with. The paper then addresses the independence movement, the first democratic rule, the 
rule of the oppressive military regime, and the present hybrid democratic rule in 
Myanmar. 
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Next, a presentation on the study of the role of the Myanmar military in the socio-
economic, political, cultural, and religious aspects and the progression of the military rule 
in Myanmar is given. The deep-rooted influence of the military on every sphere of 
Myanmar society and the relationship the military maintains with the Buddhist extremists 
and the government is then examined. The context of interdependence between the 
military and the rise of religious xenophobia is analyzed to understand why and how the 
Buddhist nationalism flourished under strict military rule. 
Later on, a presentation is given on why and how the traditional role of Buddhism 
in Myanmar has changed over the period and rapidly became radicalized. The study 
focuses on exploring the context under which Buddhism and Myanmar nationalism 
entwined together as a national identity that created a narrative of "Self and "Other."  The 
paper further examines the conditions that favored the rise of nationalism, which 
generated much intolerance and hate that led to the violent human rights abuse of 
minority Rohingyas.       
Finally, after discussing the aforementioned fundamental aspects of the Rohingya 
crisis for a complete understanding of the context of the problem, the analysis of various 
factors responsible for the escalation of religious nationalism is conducted and explained. 
The research examines the problem, analyzing the conflict supporting narratives, key 
divergent experiences, assertions, and the objectives of main stakeholders of the conflict. 
The thesis also aims to unearth the motives of transforming a peaceful religion into a 
violent form that used the religion to marginalize and exclude the religious minority 
groups and how they benefit from such motives. In the end, an assessment is given on the 
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spillover impacts of the Rohingya issue on the security situation of the South Asian 
region.  An analysis is also given confirming that the hatred and separation caused by 
religious nationalism have spread beyond the border of Myanmar and threatens not just 
the regional but also global peace.   
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
To find the answer to my research question (why and how Buddhism has become 
radicalized so much in Myanmar and how it is impacting the domestic and the regional 
peace?), I have consulted the various scholarly contents. I have found that many scholarly 
writings have focused on the main issue of the rising trend of religious nationalism in 
Myanmar and how it had been impacting the minority ethnic groups living in Myanmar. 
Though much research has highlighted the adverse impacts of religious nationalism, only 
a few researchers have analyzed and explained the root causes of religious nationalism. 
Among the existing literature on religious nationalism in Myanmar, very few have 
considered the comparison of the living conditions of the Rohingyas during different 
regimes. Again, only a few writers have explained the impacts of the religious 
nationalism on the regional and global peace. Therefore, for a comprehensive literature 
review, I have organized the existing scholarly literature and relevant resources into a few 
categories. First, I have consulted the writings of authors focusing on peace and conflict 
study to understand the nature and depth of the ongoing Rohingya crisis.  Second, I 
looked for the writings of authors whose research centers on the internal dynamics of the 
relationship between the Buddhists and the Rohingyas. Third, I have drawn information 
from the scholarly papers that have explored the existing relationship between the 
military, government, political parties, and different ethnic minority groups in Myanmar. 
Fourth, I have consulted the scholarly literature that portrayed the difficult life story of 
the Rohingya minorities. And fifth, I have conferred the official national and international 
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documents that have been published during the Rohingya crisis depicting the present 
humanitarian catastrophe and its impact on the regional and global peace.   
In order to examine the process of transformation of peaceful religious discourses 
to violent forms of extremism, we need to understand the theories related to religion and 
nationalism. According to Friedland (2001), many cultures consider religion to be not 
only a guideline for religious rituals but as a complete code of life, which provides 
images and precepts for the society, basis for governance, and guidelines for social life. 
In such communities, religious influences cannot be separated from the socio-political 
context because of the principals and values they inject into society (Friedland, 2001). On 
the other hand, according to Anastasiou (2008), nationalism promotes the ideology of the 
state or religion as sacred, and nationalist minds consider them as uncompromised and 
unique (Anastasiou, 2008). In the context of Myanmar, we can see the complex fusion of 
religious and nationalist spirit, which finally projects through vehement discourses. It 
helps to conceptualize a framework for understanding the intertwinement of the religion 
and nationalism and direct the discovery process to identify the circumstances that favor 
the nourishment of religious nationalism. 
To understand the fundamental aspects of the rise of religious nationalism, I have 
consulted the existing scholarly literature in the field of peace and conflict resolution. 
Those existing literature helped me to gain a holistic view under which circumstances the 
Rohingya conflict unfolded in Myanmar and what is the catalyst that triggered the violent 
situations of the conflict. Peter Alter, John Hutchinson, Anthony D. Smith, Tom Narin, 
Anthony Giddens, and Harry Anastasiou provided an in-depth study on the characteristics 
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of nationalism and explained the factors that favor the rise of nationalism. Jonathon Fox 
and Mark Juergensmeyer have explicitly explored the various dimensions and indications 
of religious nationalism and the socio-political contributors for the rise of religious 
nationalism. Hannah Arendt, Tom Nardin, Evrin Stub, Erich Fromm, and Foyodor 
Dostoyevsky portrayed the big picture of human nature that explains how certain 
ideology changes and transforms in certain situations. Their analysis of the development 
of certain individuals and group perspectives and how the human mind responds to 
conflict and peace helped to look holistically towards the Rohingya crisis. Their insights 
and analysis help to outline the human dimensions and societal factors that create the 
narratives for a protracted conflict in Myanmar.  
Various forces, both domestic and external, have shaped the events in Myanmar. 
Due to massive media censorship, the outside world had a limited scope regarding the 
happenings in Myanmar. Since Aung Sun Suu Kyi entered politics in 1988, what the 
world knew about Myanmar was all about the struggle for democracy because the media 
in totality highlighted her political agenda and military interferences in Myanmar politics. 
Thus, the minority oppression by the Buddhist nationalist movements and the military 
drew less media attention. The international media was mainly interested in the 
democratization process in Myanmar and, as such lost sight of the ethnic clashes and 
communal violence that ripped through the Rakhine state in particular. Buddhist 
nationalist uprisings were ignored at the expense of the political life and struggle of Aung 
Sun Suu Kyi, who became a darling of the Western press. Fink (2009), among few other 
analysts, became the exception as she focused on narrating and analyzing the experiences 
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and thoughts of the Myanmar citizens from different spheres of life to determine their 
living conditions under the prolonged military rule. The author also provided an in-depth 
study of the psychosomatic effects of military rule on the people of Myanmar. She also 
highlighted the systematic abuses, corruption, and extermination by the military rulers. 
Fink (2009) uncovered the experiences of people living under the military rule in 
Myanmar and described the roles the military have taken by themselves. She also 
discussed the existing relationship among the government, the military, the Rohingyas, 
the Buddhist nationalists, and the laypeople. Yet, in her writings, Fink (2009) has covered 
very little about the difficult living conditions of the Rohingyas.   
Jerryson and Jurgensmeyer (2010) in Buddhist Warfare, and Batholomeusz’s In 
Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka, it is shown through 
analysis of the conditions under which the peaceful traditional teachings of Buddhism has 
transformed to a violent nationalist form in present-day Myanmar. These authors 
contributed in creating an understanding of why and how Buddhist extremists adopted the 
vehement discourses, which severely disrupted the inter-ethnic communal harmony in 
Myanmar society. Also, the work of Gorski and Turkmen-Dervisoglu's Religion, 
Nationalism and Violence: An Integrated Approach and Kinnvall (2004) in her writing 
Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self Identity and the Search for Ontological 
Security provided an in-depth analysis on the context of Buddhist nationalism in 
Myanmar. Such analysis helped in understanding the nationalist characteristics of 
Buddhism in Myanmar. Holliday (2010) outlined how Myanmar’s national identity 
formed during the freedom movement against the British rule, which helped in 
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understanding the contribution that colonial rule has on the present-day Myanmar 
Rohingya conflict. However, these authors have not adequately highlighted the impacts 
of military rule on the rising trend of religious nationalism.   
Ibrahim (2016) and Zawacki (2012) have extensively engaged in addressing the 
historical background of the Rohingya crisis, the difficult reality the Rohingya have faced 
over the years, and the socio-economic and political injustice is prevailing within 
Myanmar society. Zawacki has narrated the oppressive and discriminatory experiences of 
the Rohingyas since the military rule. Ibrahim in his writing, helped to understand the 
challenges and barriers the Rohingyas are facing. However, their writing did not cover 
the difficult life situation of the liberal Buddhist society.  
The national and international documents related to the citizenship law and 
human rights, NGO and INGO reports, the UN documents, the Kofi Anan Commission 
report, and the Human Rights Commission reports providing the context to understand 
the legal and social consequences that the Rohingyas are facing. More so, the recent 
articles written on the rising trend of Buddhist extremism that led to present the Rohingya 
issue and the violence committed against them have provided useful sources of 
information, which was helpful to analyze the current situation.  
The current articles on the Rohingya crisis highlight the rising trends of Buddhist 
nationalism in the context of Myanmar.  Present socio-political environment brought 
forward by Gravers (2013) in "Spiritual Politics, Political Religion, and Religious 
Freedom in Myanmar," Beech (2013) in “The Face of Buddhist Terror” and Arai in 
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"Toward a Buddhist theory of Structural Peace: Lessons from Burma/Myanmar," Walton 
and Hayward (2014) in “Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, nationalism, 
and communal violence in Myanmar”, which all provide thought-provoking and useful 
analysis of the situation. However, most of these writings have focused on the activities 
of the Buddhist nationalists but have not highlighted enough on the institutional 
influences on Buddhist nationalism.  
Given its severity, not much study is specifically conducted on the Rohingya 
issue. Most of the studies have been undertaken from a humanitarian perspective and 
have identified the suffering, challenges, and deprivation of Rohingya minorities in 
Myanmar. However, not sufficient research has been conducted on the root causes that 
drive chronic violence against the Rohingyas.  
The existing literature is helpful in understanding the context of communal 
tension in which Rohingyas are living and the continuous structured suppression they are 
facing. The existing writings on inter-ethnic relationships also amplified the identity issue 
of Rohingyas. They also describe the role the Buddhist extremists are playing in state 
politics, the role played by Myanmar’s military in the recent situation, and the role the 
Myanmar government and political parties are playing in the Rohingya crisis. The 
existing literature helps in understanding the response of the global community on the 
Rohingya issue and the many debates it has spurred.  
To address the Rohingya crisis, we need to understand the relational aspects of 
Myanmar society and Buddhist religious narrative and the role of the military in state 
politics. There is a lack of existing literature explaining the long-established social 
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spectrum based on religion, which infused communal tension in Myanmar society and led 
to violence. There is a need for further study to understand the internal power dynamics 
of Myanmar politics and the relationship between the Buddhists, the Rohingyas, and the 
military in Myanmar. 
Lastly, the thesis studies the religious theories and the theories of nationalism to 
examine how these two intertwined in Myanmar context and what are the factors that 
created the favorable condition for such intertwinement that gave rise to Buddhist 
nationalism in Myanmar and the ensuing negative backlash.   
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Chapter 4: Brief Historical Overview of Myanmar and the Rohingya Crisis 
 4.1 Facts about Myanmar 
  Myanmar, also called Burma, is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia 
with a total area of 261,970 square miles. The population is about 55,746,253, according 
to the 2014 census (Asian Development Bank, 2012). In 1989, the military regime 
changed the country's old name 'Burma' to 'Myanmar,' and in 2006, they shifted the 
capital from Yangon to Nay Pyi Taw. Myanmar is surrounded by China to the north and 
northeast, India and Bangladesh to the west, Thailand, and Laos to the east. To the south, 
the country has an unbroken coastline of 1200 miles along the Bay of Bengal and the 
Andaman Sea. As of 2016, Myanmar ranks 145 out of 188 countries in human 
development according to the Human Development Index (United Nations Development 
Program, 2018). 
Myanmar is a country of diverse ethnicity. The statistics of major ethnic groups 
are Bamar (Native to Myanmar)-68%, Shan-9%, Karen-7%, Rakhine (Mostly Rohingya)-
4%, Mon-2%, and Other-10% (The World Factbook, 2014). According to the Myanmar 
Population and Housing census 2014, Myanmar has no official language. The majority of 
87.9% of people practice Theravada Buddhism, and other religious groups are Christian-
6.2%, Muslim-4.3%, Animist 0.8%, Hindu-0.5%, and Other-0.3%. 
The present form of government in Myanmar is a unitary parliamentary 
constitutional republic. As established in the 2008 constitution, the legislative power is 
centered around the Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), which is a national 
level bicameral legislature made up of two houses; House of Nationalities (Amyotha 
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Hluttaw), a 224-seat upper house and House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw) a 440-
seat lower house. In the upper house, among 224 seats, 168 are directly elected, and 56 
are appointed from Myanmar's Armed Forces. In the lower house, among 440 seats, 310 
are directly elected, and 110 are appointed from Armed Forces. Therefore, Myanmar 
practices a hybrid form of democracy, where general people have little role to play. The 
House of Representatives elects the president for five years term. The president is the 
head of the National Defense and Security Council and enjoys the executive power of the 
state (Steinberg and Aung-Thwin, 2019). 
Buddhism has a deep influence over almost every aspect of Myanmar society, and 
the majority of the people actively practice Buddhism. Buddhist religious leaders enjoy 
huge honor and respect in Myanmar society. Therefore, they have a strong influence on 
the government. Myanmar gained its independence on January 04, 1948, from the British 
rule. After independence, the country experienced a prolonged military rule for 51 years, 
which weakened the democratic system considerably. 
4.2 Historical Implications of the Rohingya Crisis 
To understand the present situation in Myanmar, and in particular, the Rohingya 
crisis, we need to look for the historical implications starting from the pre-colonial era. 
The root causes of communal disharmony and violent conflicts are linked with many 
significant factors that emerged during postcolonial independence, the Military rule till 
the present day hybrid democracy. 
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4.2.1 Pre Colonial Monarchy  
 In Pre-colonial times, Burma (present Myanmar) consisted of many small 
kingdoms. These kingdoms thrived over a considerable period of time. Most kings 
adopted strategies to acquire more lands, workforce, expand the military, and build 
temples and palaces. Therefore, during the war campaigns, the kings used to bring 
thousands of captives into Burma to join their workforce. Thus, the numerous settlements 
of outsiders took place in Myanmar since that time, mostly from India (Fink, 2009, pp.9-
10). 
  During the pre-colonial era, Buddhism secured a special place in Burman society. 
Most Burman kings were patrons of Buddhism and often waged war in the name of 
Buddhism. Once the British conquered Burma, they faced significant resistance from the 
Buddhist monks because the British often did not show due respect to Buddhist sacred 
places and teachings (Fink 2009, p. 13). Thus, during the British rule, whichever minority 
ethnic groups worked for the British became subject to the anguish of the Buddhists. 
Since then, the seeds of hatred and resentment towards the ethnic minority groups, 
especially the Rohingya, were planted in the minds of the Buddhist majority.    
4.2.2 Colonial Rule till Myanmar Independence  
 When the British conquered most of Myanmar and established their rule in 1885, 
the majority of Buddhists viewed them as a predator to Buddhism as well as the cultural 
heritage of Myanmar. The Buddhist kings established themselves as the primary protector 
of Buddhism, but when the British abolished their rules, most Buddhists felt that their 
religious legacy was threatened in British hands. Therefore, laypeople, including monks, 
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had serious resentment about the British and towards others who aided the British rule 
(Fink, 2019, pp.14-16). Since then, the Buddhist laypeople and religious leaders became 
more concerned about safeguarding their nationality and religion. During the colonial 
period, the tensions between the Buddhists and the Muslims surfaced in the form of the 
identity issue. Here, it is important to remember that the British empowered the ethnic 
minority groups to utilize them to support their rule, as majority Buddhists was hostile to 
them. That was the time when the seeds of communal disharmony were deeply planted. 
The mistrust and suspicion between the Buddhists and other ethnic groups were growing. 
However, it never became as violent as today; the Buddhist majority population 
maintained a sound communal harmony in Myanmar society. 
With the beginning of World War Two (WW-II), the relationship between the 
Buddhist majority and other ethnic minorities further deteriorated, as the Buddhists were 
committed to fight for the Japanese. For being part of the Burma Independent Army 
(BIA) led by General Aung San, the Majority Buddhist communities experienced torture, 
ill treatment, and economic and political oppression by the British, while the ethnic 
minority groups, including the Rohingyas, were fighting as part of the British force. With 
the end of WW-II and the allied victory, the British enhanced its control over Myanmar, 
and the ethnic minorities were credited and rewarded with business opportunities and 
employment for their service to British rule. The minority groups were economically and 
politically uplifted by the British to accomplish their “Divide and the Rule” policy. The 
British also encouraged Indian and Chinese immigration, which further endangered the 
possibilities of communal tension (Fink, 2009, p.16).  
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Due to growing pressure from the Burmese nationalist movement, the British 
decided to leave Myanmar, and on 4th January 1948, Myanmar got her independence. U 
Nu, a devotedly Buddhist politician, became the first prime minister of Myanmar. From 
independence until 1958, Myanmar experienced democratic rule, which could have 
significantly healed the resentment among different ethnic minority groups, and people 
were able to exercise their democratic rights freely (Contributor-1, Personal 
communication, August 29, 2019). However, in the latter part of U Nu's rule, due to his 
excessive devotion towards Buddhism, he favored Buddhism's to rise to the level of the 
unofficial state religion. Many ethnic groups, politicians, military generals, and laypeople 
expressed discontentment for the mismanagement of the government, and it's failure to 
keep the promises as mentioned in the 1947 constitution. As a result, in September 1958, 
a military coup was staged, and General Ne Win came to state power, which was later 
given the flavor of the voluntary handover of power, and a caretaker government was 
formed under military supervision (Fink, 2009, p.22).  
4.3 The Military Rule (1962 till 2011) and the Militarization of Myanmar Society 
In the midst of rising communal tension and amid mismanagement by the 
government, the military headed by General Ne Win took state power. Soon after the 
coup, the military gained control over most of the country by imposing tough restrictions 
on people's movements and limiting their civil rights. However, soon, the military started 
facing harder challenges regarding the market management and economic function of the 
country. There were shortages of essential commodities, and black-marketing was 
flourishing (Fink, 2009, pp.26-28). To divert people's attention from the socio-economic 
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mismanagement and to enhance military control, the Junta government took the initiative 
to introduce a new constitution for Myanmar in 1974. The constitution was passed 
through a referendum, which was highly criticized for deliberate manipulation and 
rigging. Through the 1974 constitution, one-party rule was established, and the Junta 
government created seven ethnic divisions across the country with an aim to introduce a 
discriminatory development agenda. Thus the government was able to impose any 
discriminatory policies applicable to a particular state without affecting the majority 
Buddhist population. The non-Buddhist states were given the least priority for socio-
economic development in order to gain the support of majority Buddhists in the military's 
support. More so, the military conducted massive military operations in different ethnic 
states to suppress the demands of the minority groups. General Ne Win realized that to 
sustain his illegitimate rule; he should gain the confidence of majority Buddhists. 
Therefore, he favored the rise of Buddhist nationalism by undermining other minority 
religious groups. 
  In 1975, the military intensified their operation to curb the dominance of the 
Muslim minorities, which compelled about 15,000 Rohingyas to leave the country and 
became a refugee to Bangladesh. In 1978, a two-staged massive military operation was 
conducted around Sittwe, Buthidaung, and Maungdaw in Rakhine state. More than 
200,000 Rohingyas left the country and became a refugee to Bangladesh to escape the 
military prosecution (Selth, 2018). The Junta government was not only relying on 
military operations; they also took steps to eliminate the Rohingyas legally. In 1982 the 
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Junta promulgated new citizenship law, which stripped the citizenship rights of millions 
of Rohingyas.   
According to the citizenship law, the Muslim minority Rohingyas were not 
qualified as a citizen as they were excluded from the ethnic minority lists, as stated in the 
law. The military promulgated this discriminatory law with deliberate planning of 
boosting communal tensions so that warlike situation prevails in Myanmar, which helps 
to justify the military rule. Without citizenship rights, the Rohingyas were denied primary 
healthcare, education, and political rights, and even their movements were restricted. The 
Rohingyas were not also incorporated in the list of 135 ethnic groups, as stated in the 
citizenship law (Walton & Hayward, 2014, p.4). Therefore, without citizenship and legal 
recognition, the Rohingyas became subject to state-sponsored discrimination and 
suppression. Thus the Ne Win government planted the seeds for anti-Rohingya narratives 
and aimed to keep the majority Buddhist community at his side. 
 With the inherent inability of the military in the political and economic role, the 
Ne Win government collapsed in July 1988 for mismanagement of state affairs, and the 
Military took direct control of the power through a staged coup. The military decided to 
rule the country through the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).  The 
Military continued aggressive operations in Rakhine state against the Rohingyas 
throughout the 1990s and later. The operation Pyi Thaya was conducted in Rakhine state 
to curb the growing populous dominance of the Rohingyas. During the operation, the 
property and business centers of the Rohingyas were confiscated, Muslims were forcibly 
employed in forced labor, and many were evicted from their homes and became a refugee 
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to Bangladesh (Walton & Hayward, 2014, pp.4-5). They were also barred from 
performing their religion freely, and many mosques were demolished. The military also 
imposed numerous discriminatory policies against the Rohingyas, which obstructed their 
access to basic human needs and undermined their fundamental human rights 
(Contributor-1, Personal Communication, August 29, 2019). 
After coming to power, the military formed SLORC, which was subsequently 
renamed as State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). SPDC started ruling the 
country through a divide and rule policy and focused on igniting the resentment of the 
ethnic minority groups through a set of discriminatory policies and actions. The military 
aligned with the Buddhist extremist groups to gain the support of the majority Buddhist 
population and had been sponsoring the radical Buddhist nationalist movement Ma Ba 
Tha led by Aswin Wirathu. In 2012, the Buddhist extremist groups under the banner of 
Ma Ba Tha called for a countrywide boycott of the Muslims. The campaigners asked 
people not to buy products from the Muslim shops, avoid buying their agro products and 
isolate them in communities (Walton & Hayward, 2014, pp.4-5). The Buddhist extremists 
propagated hate speeches through rallies, meetings, leaflets, and community talks, which 
boosted the decades-long ongoing communal tension. In Rakhine state and some parts of 
other states, the Buddhist nationalists incited violence against the Muslims and killed 
many. Instead of protecting the minority Muslims, the military actively aided the 
extremists to persecute and evict the Muslims (Bookbinder, 2013). Besides the killing, 
huge property damage was caused for the Muslims, including the bulldozing number of 
mosques. Approximately 100,000 Rohingyas became homeless. 
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4.4 Present State of the Rohingya Crisis 
The recent Rohingya crisis in Myanmar in 2017 was widely condemned as ethnic 
cleansing due to the nature and severity of the violence that perpetrated against the 
Rohingyas. Since August 2017, the Myanmar military, along with Buddhist monks 
committing mass-scale human rights violations by killing, raping, and evicting thousands 
of innocent Rohingya. Myanmar military claimed that on August 25, 2017, Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked several police check posts in Rakhine state. 
In retaliation to that, the military aligned with Buddhist monks conducted so-called 
“Clearance Operation,” which has encompassed killing many thousands of people, raped 
uncounted numbers of women and children, and burned most of the Rohingya villages 
and business centers. Approximately 800,000 Rohingya have been displaced from the 
northern Rakhine province of Myanmar, and they became a refugee in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and to other neighboring countries (United Nations Human 
Rights Council, 2018). Two years have passed, yet their repatriation in Myanmar did not 
take place. Still, the Myanmar military, along with Buddhist extremists continue 
systematic violence against the Rohingyas in the Rakhine state. Their lands are 
confiscated and used for the construction of new military installations and houses for the 
Buddhists. The government has not taken any credible steps against the perpetrators 
(United Nations Human Rights Council, 2019). The international community has yet 
failed to take any concrete steps to make Myanmar government accountable for mass 
human rights violations. 
 
28 
 
 
Chapter 5: Analysis of the Socio-Political Developments that Led to the 
Rohingya Crisis 
 
5.1 Changes that Took Place inside Myanmar Government  
Since the starting of the military rule in 1962, the country has gone through many 
changes and amendments. The changes took place both inside the government and on the 
broader society. However, most of the radical changes did not take place through a 
democratic process. The military junta mostly brought the changes. Therefore, the hopes 
and aspirations of the mass of the people are not reflected in government policies and 
reforms. The changes in Myanmar society were intended to conform to the military rule, 
not to bring economic freedom; thus, the changes failed to ensure the socio-economic 
liberty of the people.  
The 2010 election and the restoration of the parliament's function brought some 
hope in the minds of the freedom-loving Myanmar society. Most people hoped to see a 
definite shift from the decades-long military rule to a democratic process, but some 
people had apprehension about the actual intention of the military. The minority ethnic 
groups were dreaming for a better future, but the reality has been quite different. Though 
the military Junta formally handed over the power to a civilian authority, they decided to 
be the driving force and the navigator of the civilian government. With utter surprise, the 
people of Myanmar found the executions of Junta's policies through a civilian 
government. The military set the strings on the civilian government to regulate the 
motion of the state power. By involving the political parties in the military-led hybrid 
governmental system, the military could further reduce the ability of the political 
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oppositions and the civil society to protest against the military government. Most 
government agencies and corporations received retired military officials as their head.  
More so, the military also maintained its significant influence in the political sphere 
through the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which the military formed 
with an aim to control the politics in Myanmar. USDP mainly consists of former military 
officials and their collaborators, mostly (Guilloux, 2010, pp.383-401). Considering the 
scope of this paper, the changes that took place inside the governmental system and in 
Myanmar society since 1990 are briefly discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.  
5.1.1 Constitutional reforms 
The main policy change of the government was the change of the constitution of 
Myanmar, which was ratified by the union of Burma in 1947. During the period of direct 
military rule, the military authority has changed the constitution twice. After the 
independence of Myanmar the military first changed the constitution in 1974. The current 
constitution was enacted in 2008, through a staged referendum where people’s 
participation was very minimum.  As per the current law, the legislative branch denotes 
to the Assembly of the Union, which is a bicameral legislature comprising of the 440 
seats House of the Representatives and the 224 seats of House of Nationalities. A 
maximum of 56 of 224 seats in the National Assembly and 110 seats of 440 in the 
people's assembly are reserved for serving military members (Myanmar, 2014). The 
constitution was adopted through a referendum, which was highly criticized for 
unfairness because major political parties were not welcomed to contribute to the 
conception of the constitution (Martin, 2010). The Myanmar constitution has given 
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legitimacy to robust military control over the civilian government. The serving military 
generals always hold influential ministries like the Ministry of Borders, Ministry of 
Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of the Office of the Union Government. 
Another contentious issue in the constitution is the citizenship rights of the Muslim 
minority Rohingyas. This decision has affected the lives of Rohingyas living in 
Myanmar. The Muslim community has been systematically excluded from the rights and 
privileges of citizens. The citizenship rights of the Rohingyas are denied through the 
constitution, and their voting rights are also rejected. They became legally marginalized 
in the society, subject to all sorts of discrimination and oppression, and vulnerable to 
intimidating legal action.  
5.1.2 Institutionalization of military rule  
Since the beginning of the military rule, the only crisis Myanmar military faced 
was the legitimization of their existence in state power both internally and externally. 
Myanmar civil society often tried to protest the military rule in many forms, but it was 
mainly the students and the monks who could openly protest against the military 
government. The student protest happened countrywide in August 1988, and they were 
protesting the economic mismanagement, corruption, police brutality, and human rights 
violations by the Junta. The Buddhist monks led another significant movement in 
October 2007, popularly known as the “Saffron Movement.” The “Saffron Movement” 
was a sequence of socio-economic and political dissents and protests against the 
Myanmar military Junta. However, both the revolutionary movements were cracked 
down by the military with violent force that resulted in thousands of deaths and 
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indiscriminate arrests and detentions (Fink, 2009, pp.354-370). The international 
community and the UN imposed numerous sanctions to compel the Myanmar 
government to comply with the human rights standards (Human Rights Watch, 2014). 
In light of the above situation, the Myanmar military opted out for a narrative that 
was based on religious connotation and capable of mobilizing mass people in their favor 
in the name of combating the threat against their religious legacy and national 
sovereignty. Though realistically, Myanmar was not vulnerable to any external 
aggression, and their religious legacy was not threatened. 
5.1.3 Weakening of democratic institutions       
In 1991 the military government focused on four objectives to consolidate the 
military rule for an infinite period (Fink 2009, p.70). First, they decided to increase the 
size of the armed forces to enhance their strength against the ethnic armed militia and the 
political rivals. Accordingly, massive recruitment took place in the military, and the 
strength of the armed forces was increased from 180,000 to 300,000 by the next two 
years (Fink, 2009, p.70). New military bases were constructed throughout the country so 
that troops can be readily available in every part of the country to tackle any movement 
against the military government. 
Second, the military government adopted the strategy to breakdown the 
organizational setup of all the democratic entities in Myanmar.  As a result, the local 
authorities used a variety of methods to put pressure on the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) members to resign (Fink 2009, p.70). In order to understand the 
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rationality of the military's such approach, it is necessary to realize what kinds of 
insecurity the military perceives. The military's perceived insecurity is based on the fear 
of being held accountable for their past offenses and human rights violations in case the 
regime is ousted from state power in the face of a popular uprising. Therefore, it can be 
anticipated that the military will take any steps necessary to eliminate any threat they 
perceive towards the power status.  
Third, the regime took the initiative to eliminate the ethnic armed struggles by 
forcing the ethnic armed groups to sign ceasefire agreements. The ceasefire agreement 
proved successful, and the military had greater access to ethnic nationality areas. But they 
have not signed the ceasefire agreement with the ARSA in Rakhine state where the 
military was fully in control of the situation and heavily engaged in a crackdown 
operation against the Rohingya minorities (Fink 2009, pp70-73). It is presumed that as 
the proposal for the ceasefire agreement came from the armed groups operating in the 
north of Myanmar, the government has not denied it because the denial of such a 
proposal would critically undermine the government's so-called willingness for the peace. 
Instead the military utilized the ceasefire with all armed groups except ARSA as an 
opportunity to strengthen their positions in the northern sector.  
Fourth, the SLORC decided to adopt the open market economy to uplift the 
economic condition by lifting the restrictions from trade and foreign investment. 
However, the problem was the lack of expertise of the military to oversee the economic 
policies. Again, the military leadership was unwilling to employ expert economists for 
economic reform. Thus the generals with their self-proclaimed expertise initiated the 
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economic reform.  As a result, with an initial flame of development in the early 1990s, 
the country mostly suffered from the decreasing foreign investment, a serious diminution 
of the foreign reserve, and rampant inflation (Fink 2009, pp.71-74). It can be easily 
assumed that these financial conditions might often have encouraged the military Junta to 
adopt some narratives to divert the attention of the people from the ongoing economic 
crisis. The famous Saffron Movement took place due to financial mismanagement by the 
military government. 
5.1.4 Shifting the capital and name changes 
The military government also decided to give a new name for the country. So they 
choose ‘Myanmar’ as the new name for Burma. They also renamed the capital from 
“Rangoon” to “Yangon” in 1989, stating that those old names were associated with the 
colonial age. Without considering the historical and cultural connotations, the military 
regime moved the capital from Yangon to Nay Pyi Taw. The people’s opinions were not 
considered while changing of country’s name and shifting the capital to a new location 
(Houtman, 1999, pp. 43-54). The people thus widely suspected that the military shifted 
the capital to undermine the support structure of the political parties surrounding the old 
capital and to consolidate military control over the new capital. Masses of people 
protested on the street of Yangon against the name change of the country, but the 
government remained adamant in their decision (Houtman, 1999, pp. 43-54).  
Though the name changes do have some religious significance, many Myanmar 
citizens believe that the issue is more political as most of the revolutionary scripts and 
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slogans are associated with the old name “Burma.” However, the change of the capital 
was much beneficial for the military, as they wanted the capital to be free from the 
political crowd. The military initiated a rumor that the US might intervene in Myanmar at 
any moment. Therefore, to protect the government machinery from the intervention, the 
capital needs to be shifted to an inaccessible location. Now, the new capital is surrounded 
by military installations. In the present capital, the population is four times the size of 
London with only 924,608 people and cost about $ 4 billion in US dollars (Millington, 
2017). The new capital is planned, executed, and financially managed by the military 
government. The people of Myanmar were compelled to accept the government's 
decision for security issues, but they saw this change as the military effort to consolidate 
the state power for the military rule (Contributor-2, Personal Communication, August 30, 
2019). The security issues often brought up by the military overshadowed the democratic 
vision of Myanmar society, which in turn further entrenched and reinforced the power of 
the military and consequently made it more of an authoritarian regime.  
5.2 Changes that Took Place in Myanmar Society 
People of Myanmar have also experienced many changes in society during the 
military rule. The societal values have shifted from moralistic to materialistic. People 
carry the values of democracy, social justice, and equality, but over the years, when they 
have found it difficult to express such values and the consequences of expressing such 
values publicly, they changed their values as a survival technique. Despite their dislike of 
the military regime, many parents in Myanmar society motivate their children to abide by 
the military restrictions and wish their children to join the military, and thus the youths 
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become part of the oppressive system (Fink, 2009,pp.114-115). Under the prolonged 
military rule in Myanmar, people’s priority has shifted from doing things that are right to 
do to things that are required to survive. Society is learning how to survive rather than to 
foster social values.  
In Myanmar society, the families are closely interwoven, and parents mainly 
make the decision for their children's future, education, and work. Most parents today 
want their children to join government services as the benefits are more, and the 
opportunity prevails to make more money, often through corruption. The military regime 
systematically induced corruption in society through families. To enter any of the 
government positions, a high school or university graduate must have no history of anti-
government political activities. Thus, the need to foster conformity begins early from 
school. Parents encourage their children to join government-sponsored organizations to 
avoid suspicion. Since the formation of the military-sponsored political party named the 
Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) in 1993, high school and 
university students are expected to become members. However, ethnic minorities, like 
Rohingyas, have little chance to join the USDA, and they are not allowed to participate in 
government services (Fink 2009, pp.73-80).  
In Myanmar society, ethnic minority families face similar challenges like other 
families. Besides, they experience discrimination in political, socio-economic, and 
religious contexts (Contributor 3, Personal Communication, August 30, 2019). As the 
successive military regimes have emphasized Myanmar culture, Myanmar history, and 
Buddhism as the critical pillars of Myanmar national identity, other ethnic and religious 
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groups became marginalized and often subject to discrimination. Ethnic minority 
languages are rarely taught in schools, and their cultures are in the process of depletion 
(Contributor 4, Personal Communication, September 1, 2019). The situation is worst for 
the Rohingyas, who are denied citizenship rights. Thus they are barred to education in 
public schools, and government-provided health care, positions in government services, 
and many more opportunities. The majority of Myanmar society often remains engaged 
in a survival struggle, thus hardly grow any sympathy, compassion, and accommodation 
for minority groups. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis of the contexts of Rising Buddhist Nationalism and Anti-
Muslim Narrative 
6.1 Traditional Role of Buddhism and Discrepancies from Its Teaching 
Buddhism is widely known as a peaceful religion for a long time. There is no 
denying the fact that, like other religions, Buddhism is also accused of its violent form, 
but it was never like today in Myanmar. The mass human rights violations and incitement 
of violence by Buddhist monks in the name of religion in Myanmar portrayed Buddhism 
as a violent religion. The question is, when Buddhism is gaining popularity all over the 
world due to its peaceful and calm image, why it is becoming increasingly violent in 
Myanmar? What are the driving forces transforming peaceful Buddhism to a violent 
religion? However, it is quite evident that Buddhism has not transformed into a violent 
form suddenly; it has been gradually radicalized through a systemic process. There is a 
progressive uprising of Buddhist extremist ideology throughout the period of the Junta 
regime in Myanmar.  The situation was not always like this. Until the decades-long 
military rule, both the Muslim and the Buddhist communities coexisted peacefully for 
centuries (Contributor-5, Personal Communication, September 1, 2019). There were 
many instances of communal harmony and peaceful coexistence amongst the Buddhists 
and the Muslims in Myanmar (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 48). However, throughout the military 
rule, the junta systemically planted the seeds of religious nationalism, which generated 
religious intolerance and mistrust among the Buddhists and the Muslims. This chapter 
discusses the conditions under which the peaceful Buddhist teachings were transformed 
in vehement discourses to propagate the anti-Muslim narrative in Myanmar. 
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6.2 The Radicalization of Buddhist Teaching in Myanmar   
It is very important for this study to trace the circumstances through which 
Buddhism has been radicalized in Myanmar. Unveiling the conditions that endorsed 
Buddhist extremist ideology in some parts of Myanmar society will help us to understand 
why Buddhism shifted from peaceful to violent forms and who benefits. Buddhism was 
aligned with state politics and turned out into the central pillar of Myanmar national 
identity, but it never shifted to extremism the way it shifted during the military rule. 
Therefore, my argument is, there must have been some favorable situation created during 
the military rule, which inspired the Buddhist nationalism to rise at the present level. 
Now, we need to examine the prevailing socio-political situation during the military rule 
and the role Buddhism played during that period. Another aspect we need to understand 
is what really signifies the rise of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar. Both aspects are 
discussed in detail in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Myanmar is not a monolithic nation-state; there are many ethnic groups practicing 
various religious beliefs in different regional contexts. Among them, Buddhism emerged 
as the main religion in Myanmar for centuries and became strongly linked to the 
country's national identity as the Buddhist kings patronized, uplifted, and safeguarded it 
through many centuries. Successively, the Buddhist majority reached 87% of the total 
population in Myanmar (Kawanami, 2009). Thereby, over time, Buddhism has been 
embedded with power politics and established a dominant culture and political 
acceptability in Myanmar. In present times, the successive governments continue to 
sponsor the Buddhist religious legacy over other religions. This sponsorship has 
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encouraged the radical Buddhist monks to undermine other religious minority groups and 
thus have developed little to no empathy for minority groups. Thus, showcasing of any 
religious activity by minority religious groups were found by the Buddhist nationalists as 
religious aggression. Therefore, when the Rohingya population rose than previous years 
in Rakhine state, the Buddhist extremists group envisioned it as a threat to Buddhist 
legacy, and accordingly, they developed their anti-Muslim narrative (Walton & Hayward, 
2014, p.6).   
6.3 Discrepancies of Buddhist Teaching in Myanmar 
The question that moved me to study the religious nationalism in Myanmar was, 
'why has Buddhism shifted from its traditional peaceful teaching to vehement discourses 
in Myanmar? After following the ongoing situation in Myanmar, it is quite evident that a 
significant part of the Buddhist population in Myanmar has shifted from the traditional 
practice of Buddhism. It is imperative to examine the conditions, which encouraged the 
discrepancies of conventional Buddhist teaching. There is a distinct polarization of the 
Buddhist community in Myanmar, the liberal Buddhists, and the radical Buddhists. The 
liberal Buddhists who mostly rallied around the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee 
never endorsed the initiative of the Buddhist nationalist groups (Bookbinder, 2013). For 
example, in 2016, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee banned Ma Ba Tha for not 
conforming to Buddhist teaching. The Sangha rejected the activities of the '969' 
movement because of the discrepancies of their teaching with Buddhist teaching. 
Buddhist spiritual leader, the Da-Lai-Lama, also condemned the actions of '969' after the 
communal riot in 2012 (Fuller, 2013). Though many Buddhists, who rallied behind the 
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'969' movement, viewed it as a struggle for the protection of their religious legacy and 
national identity, many Buddhist scholars dismissed the 969 movements as it never 
carried the values of Buddhist teachings. The important Buddhist teachings are to look 
for a deeper association of friends, family, and the whole world. Moreover, according to 
Buddhist ideology, every individual should work to eliminate the suffering and not cause 
pain for others (Arai, 2013, p.16). If we compare these teachings with the ideology 
expressed by the Buddhist extremists, we can easily understand how much they have 
shifted from the values of Buddhism.   
The acts of the Buddhist extremist monks can be related with the action of 
Dostoyevsky's "The Grand Inquisitor," where the grand inquisitor comprehended the 
responsibility of the guardian of the religion in his form and did not necessarily comply 
with the original values (Dostoyevsky, Granett & Hubben, 1948). In the name of 
safeguarding the religion the way the grand inquisitor adopted a coercive religious 
measure to control the people, the Buddhist nationalist monks used the religious scripture 
to propagate their anti-Muslim narrative. 
The idea of constructing and protecting a mono-ethnic view of national identity, 
which includes Buddhism as a singular religious identity in Myanmar, views others who 
are non-Buddhist as the enemy and impure. This nationalist view created a rift in 
Myanmar society and generated much intolerance. By developing a narrative of identity 
politics that attributed to national identity based on Buddhism, the Buddhist nationalists, 
along with other state actors, created the anti-Muslim narrative. As a result, traditional 
peaceful Buddhism started to move in the direction of nationalism, which undermines 
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peaceable quality for which Buddhism is traditionally known.  
6.4 Intertwinement of Buddhist Nationalists and the Military  
After investigating the incidents of recent communal violence that occurred 
throughout the military rule, it became more apparent that the military did not perform its 
desired role in protecting civilian life and property (Bookbinder, 2013). Besides, the 
military, on a few occasions, played a controversial role by aiding the Buddhist 
extremists to perpetrate violence against the Muslim minority Rohingyas (Contributor-6, 
Personal communication, September 2, 2019). Therefore it became clear that the military 
Junta patronized Buddhism to draw the support of the majority of the population for their 
illegitimate rule. However, after the 2007 'Saffron' movement, the military junta inclined 
more towards the Buddhist extremist groups led by Aswin Wirathu, who became a 
second voice for the military.  Both 969 and Ma Ba Tha enjoyed enormous liberty and 
facilities in propagating their anti-Muslim narratives. The military purposefully provided 
resources and platforms to the Buddhist nationalists to use them as a linchpin for creating 
communal tension (Al-Jazeera, 2019). By patronizing the Buddhist nationalism, the 
military intended to achieve two things: one, to gain the popular support of the majority 
Buddhists, and two, to create an anarchic situation which will always help to justify the 
military rule as the protector of national unity. However, it is crucial to investigate how 
the Buddhist extremist groups became entangled deeply with the military in propagating 
the anti-Muslim hate campaign. 
The "Saffron Movement" was the critical turning point for the military policy in 
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dealing with the Buddhist majority population, as their support is a crucial component for 
the military rule to survive. Military action to control the "Saffron Movement" created 
massive resentment among the majority Buddhists (Fink, 2009, pp.102-103). According 
to U Gambira, a Saffron Movement activist, after the movement, the military aimed to 
appease the Buddhist monks and offered $3000 to each of the prominent monks (Al-
Jazeera, 2019), and at the same time, they inclined to Buddhist extremists groups who are 
less critical about military rule and who strive to gain greater influence over society 
through their radical view. The military found Aswin Wirathu and his radical ideology to 
be more in line with military strategy. Accordingly, Aswin Wirathu was uplifted and 
provided with the needed freedom to launch his hate campaign through the much-
criticized 969 anti-Muslim campaigns. Khin Saw Win, an activist, communal religious 
analyst, who described the intertwinement of Buddhist Nationalists and the Military and 
commented, “so the monks and the military entered into this kind of unholy alliance” 
(Al-Jazeera, 2019).   
6.5 Indications of the Rise of Buddhist Nationalism in Myanmar 
For many centuries till today, Buddhism enjoyed a unique position in Myanmar 
society, but it was never radicalized to the extent it has reached today. There had been 
many incidents of communal clash between Buddhists and the Muslims during the 
colonial and pre-colonial era, but those were less destructive, and the communal harmony 
was restored. For understanding the rising trend of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, we 
need to know about the following two movements of the Buddhist extremist groups: 
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6.5.1 The ‘969’ Movement 
The '969' movement was an important campaign initiated by the Buddhist 
nationalists for propagating their anti-Muslim narrative. The movement was started in 
early 2012, and the prominent Buddhist monk Aswin Wirathu led it. The Buddhist 
extremists claimed that the purpose of '969' is to "create a common symbol that enables 
all Buddhists to pay respect to the triple gems readily: the Buddha, the Dharma (Buddhist 
teaching) and the Sangha (the community)" (Arai, 2013, p.12). Initiators of the 
movement claim that '969' signify the virtue of Buddha, Buddhist practice, and the 
Buddhist community (Bookbinder, 2013). The '969' movement used the symbol of the 
pillar constructed during the rule of prominent Buddhist king Ashoka with an aim to 
unify the people under his rule. However, the ultimate intention of the movement was to 
unite the Buddhist community centered around this symbol to promote Buddhist 
nationalism and thereby notwithstanding other religious minorities.  Through this 
movement, Aswin Wirathu emerged as an important figure in Myanmar politics by virtue 
of his ability to mobilize people in the anti-Muslim campaign. He also spread his anti-
Muslim hate campaign beyond Myanmar’s border, and in 2015 he addressed the Sri 
Lankan monks while visiting Sri Lanka. Aswin Wirathu was invited to Sri Lanka as part 
of the alliance created to propagate the anti-Muslim narrative (AP, 2015). The manifesto 
of the '969' movement was to establish Buddhist Myanmar and to curb the demographic 
expansion of the Muslims in the Rakhine state. The movement also called for boycotting 
the business centers owned by the Muslims to cripple the Muslims economically. 
However, the movement was deemed by many as Islamophobic and anti-Muslim for its 
44 
 
 
hateful propaganda against the Muslims. The activists of the '969' movement distributed 
leaflets, stickers, banners, and DVDs among the people to propagate the anti-Muslim 
narrative (Bookbinder, 2013). The movement generated strong reactions both in-home 
and abroad for its role in inciting a communal riot in the Rakhine state in 2012. 
In October 2012, the '969' campaign incited ethnic violence among the Buddhists 
and the Rohingyas in Meiktila, and later it spread to many other cities in Myanmar. The 
Buddhist nationalists lead this communal riot against the Rohingyas (Contributor-7, 
personal communication, September 2, 2019). Approximately 200 Rohingyas were 
killed, hundreds injured, many women were raped, about 3,000 houses were demolished, 
and 14 mosques were set ablaze (Kipgen, 2013). The security forces did not take any 
actions to protect the Rohingyas; instead, they aided the Buddhist extremists to perpetrate 
violence. Even local policemen did not stop the violence (Contributor-8, personal 
communication, September 2, 2019). This incident raised questions about the mutual 
support between the Buddhist extremists and the Myanmar military. When under strict 
military surveillance, people did not dare to speak freely, then how the Buddhist 
nationalists were allowed to propagate hate speeches through regular meetings, rallies, 
and leaflets. Many people also doubted that the military might have encouraged and 
instigated the Buddhist extremists to commit violence (Contributor-9, personal 
communication, September 3, 2019). It is necessary to understand the rationality of the 
role played by the military during the violent incident. The motive of the ‘969’ movement 
has proven to be a political standpoint because while the concern over predatory practices 
by multinational companies may be credible, the fusion of these concerns with the 
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Rohingya Muslim minorities is regarded as highly questionable and dangerous.    
6.5.2 Ma Ba Tha 
 The Patriotic Association of Myanmar, widely known as Ma Ba Tha (The 
abbreviated Burmese form), meaning Association for the Protection of Race and 
Religion, was established in January 2014, from the backdrop of the '969' movement 
(Kyaw, 2014). Ma-Ba Tha was well known for its anti-Muslim narrative and was not 
endorsed by the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (Gravers, 2015, p. 14). Ashwin 
Wirathu was a prominent figure of Ma Ba Tha, and many leading figures from the '969' 
movement joined with him. People suspected that as the State Sangha Maha Nayaka 
Committee prohibited the use of the '969' emblem for political purpose, therefore, 
Buddhist extremist groups founded Ma Ba Tha as an alternative platform for the anti-
Muslim campaign (Walton & Hayward, 2014, pp.14-15). Ma-Ba Tha has widespread 
networks and chapters all over Myanmar (Kyaw, 2014).  
The most significant campaign of the organization was to draft and publicize the 
controversial religious bill, which was aimed to control religious conversion and 
interreligious marriage and enforcement of monogamy and population control measures. 
In 2013, the organization conducted countrywide advertisement in favor of the bill and 
lobbied for the bill to pass with immediate effect. According to religious law, if a non-
Buddhist man marries a Buddhist woman, they need to register their intent with the local 
authority and will be allowed only if the local authority gives permission. The Buddhist 
wife will not be able to convert into the husband's religion. On the other hand, the man 
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needs to convert in Buddhism in order to marry a Buddhist woman. Ma-Ba Tha was 
highly criticized inside and outside Myanmar for its campaign for such a discriminatory 
law. However, the initiatives taken by Ma Ba Tha and their campaign patterns indicated 
that they were well organized, focused, and more strategic than the '969' movement in 
pursuing their anti-Muslim agenda (Walton & Hayward, 2014, pp.14-15). In July 2016, 
State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, through a statement issued, disbanded Ma Ba 
Tha. The statement said, "Since the first to the fifth Sangha conventions of all Buddhists 
orders from 1980 to 2014, none had endorsed Ma Ba Tha's legitimacy or even used the 
term Ma Ba Tha" (Times, 2016).  
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Chapter 7: Analysis of the Key Divergent Experiences of the Groups and Conflict 
 
Supporting Narratives 
 
7.1 Conflict Supportive Narratives  
Societies engaged in a perverse conflict, form the conflict supportive narratives 
that enlighten and rationalize the conflicts. These narratives hugely contribute to pleasing 
the fundamental socio-psychological desires of the conflicting groups. These narratives 
are extremely important in an intractable conflict where human losses and sufferings lead 
to prolonged suffering. In a protracted conflict, supporting narratives play a vital role in 
flaring-up and persistence of conflicts where the use of violent means is encouraged; 
these vicious ways often abuse the ethical codes (Bar-Tal, Oren & Nets, 2014, pp.662-
675). If we look towards the Myanmar Rohingya conflict, we can find a systematic 
process through which the followers of Buddhism (A peaceful religion) turned in to 
murderers. The Buddhist extremist groups used the violent anti-Rohingya narrative to 
bring this transformation.  
Conflict supportive narratives accomplish the task of magnifying the conflict, 
which increases the chances of a greater level of ambiguity, instability, violence, and 
suffering. Conflict supporting narratives also justify the destructive ways and means that 
are adopted by the conflicting parties against each other (Bar-Tal, Oren & Nets, 2014, 
pp.662-675). Each side's narrative prepares the group to resort to violence and genocidal 
acts and also to sustain the abuse of the other side. Conflict supporting narratives label 
the violent acts as heroic acts, and the harms are termed as a greater sacrifice for their 
own group. Through this process, conflict supporting narratives shape the ideological 
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perception of patriotic acts and greater sacrifice, which are then defined by each group 
form their historical and socio-political contexts. This respective ideological perception 
determines how the group members should process the information, which helps them to 
view the conflict from a similar lens, and this helps the conflict to continue (Bar-Tal, 
Oren & Nets, 2014, pp.662-672).    
 In the case of Myanmar, the anti-Rohingya narrative initiated by the Buddhist 
extremist groups and the military conditioned the Myanmar society over the years. 
Therefore, even after practicing a peaceful religion, the majority Buddhist communities 
bear little sympathy for the Rohingyas, even when the Rohingyas are subject to ethnic 
cleansing (Contributor-10, Personal Communication, September 3, 2019). The general 
Buddhist population is indoctrinated to a radical form of Buddhism and largely motivated 
by the extremists. The Buddhist extremists unite the majority Buddhists by projecting the 
Rohingyas as a threat to Buddhist legacy in Myanmar. 
7.2 Power Imbalance and Conflict Supporting Narratives 
Each side’s conflict supporting narratives are shaped by their status of power 
(Bar-Tal, Oren & Nets, 2014, p.662). The side having more and absolute power can 
expand their narratives, targeting all spheres of human lives of other sides. The powerful 
sides are often capable of utilizing many currencies to propagate their narratives. In the 
case of Myanmar, the anti-Rohingya narrative stirred by the Buddhist extremists, the 
military, and the government could develop the anti-Rohingya narrative in a way they 
wanted, because they enjoy state power and social privileges. On the other hand, the sides 
with less power are not able to formulate their narratives and usually have fewer 
49 
 
 
currencies to use to shape their narratives. Like in Myanmar, the Rohingyas are not 
having any legal status now and little sympathy from the majority population, and thus, 
unable to formulate their narrative with fewer social currencies. Therefore, respective 
conflict supporting narratives are developed differently and end up in perpetuating further 
power inequalities in a conflict.  
7.3 Experience of the Buddhist Extremists 
 The experience of the Buddhist extremist groups is based on fear, uncertainty, and 
their appealing responsibility towards the religious community and the nation. After 
analyzing the religious scripts, sermons, interviews, and the lectures of Buddhist 
nationalist leaders, it appears that the Buddhist extremist groups constantly driven by the 
fear of losing their religious influence. Such apprehension is not inappropriate because, 
during the colonial rule, the Buddhist community experienced devaluation of their 
religion under British rule. In the pre-colonial era, Buddhism was promoted and 
safeguarded by the kings and rulers, but with British occupation, such a legacy of 
Buddhism was diminished, which was a tragic and dishonorable period for the Buddhist 
community. The Buddhist extremist groups feel the burden of responsibility to regain 
their religious legacy. The question is that the colonial rule is not prevailing now, then, 
why to fear? According to Buddhist extremist leader Aswin Wirathu, the global jihadist 
movement of the Muslims creates a fearful environment for the Buddhists in Myanmar 
(Thompson, 2013). The Buddhist extremists view the rise of the Rohingya population in 
the Rakhine state as an impediment for their quest for national purity, a Buddhist nation. 
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The appealing sense of responsibility of the Buddhist extremists shaped their 
experiences in the Myanmar Rohingya conflict. Buddhist monks have been guiding the 
communities for many decades. Such inherited responsibility inspired the Buddhist 
nationalist leaders to lead the society in time while global peace and stability are 
threatened due to the rise of Islamic extremism. According to Aswin Wirathu, they feel 
their responsibility as a conscious citizen of Myanmar, to combat the Jihadist for the sake 
of the nation as well for Buddhism. However, in practical, only3.7 % of Muslims live in 
Myanmar.    
The experience of laypeople that followed the Buddhist extremist ideology was 
quite different than the experiences of their leadership. Rewards and punishment mostly 
constructed the experience of the followers. The majority of the followers feel that, if 
they do not follow the call of the Buddhist extremist leaders to save the national identity 
and religious legacy, probably something terrible will happen to them spiritually. Many 
of them consider it their moral duty to save Buddhist heritage, and therefore they are 
motivated to do anything for that cause. Another issue that played a vital role in shaping 
their experience was military rule. The Buddhist extremist followers understand that if 
they are at the side of military initiatives, they will be benefited economically and 
socially. They perceived that, when the Rohingyas are eliminated, they would be able to 
enjoy the property and business centers of the Rohingyas (Contributor-11, Personal 
Communication, September 4, 2019). The Buddhist followers, at the same time, 
understood the danger of noncompliance with the military or the government initiatives. 
Many followers, including the top leader Aswin Wirathu, have the experience of abuse 
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and oppression by the military. At any point in their life, if they fail to conform to the 
military and government, they have to face serious consequences. 
7.4 Experiences of the Liberal Buddhists and the Civil Society in Myanmar 
One aspect of the Myanmar socio-political scenario needs to be understood that it 
is not only the Muslim minorities who are experiencing oppression. The liberal 
Buddhists, who do not conform to the radical ideology of Buddhist extremists and the 
military, are also experiencing oppression. The progressive Buddhist majority of people 
who generally constitute the civil society in Myanmar even experience a lack of freedom 
and constant surveillance by the military. Though the government appears to be 
democratic, they are tightly held with strings of military influences. People experience a 
lack of freedom of expression; they cannot freely express their thoughts and ideas about 
political, religious, or social stands. The media and press are subject to tight censorship, 
and any criticism about the actions or policy of the military, the government, or the 
Buddhist extremist groups are dealt very severely (Fink, 2009,pp.206-208). Even many 
journalists are killed, disappeared, or imprisoned for their news/writings on the atrocities 
conducted by the military and Buddhist extremist groups. Liberal Buddhists and civil 
society are highly frustrated because of the degradation of traditional Buddhist morality 
by the Buddhist extremist groups. The liberal Buddhists often get upset when they are 
unable to stop the extremists (Contributor 11, Personal Communication, September 4, 
2019). They find themselves trapped and suffocated in a state-sponsored, systematic 
cycle of oppression, and are unable to come out of this vicious cycle. For a long time, 
they have experienced violence, abuse, discrimination, and exclusion in society and the 
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burden of truth about human rights violations, which they are not able to express to the 
outside world.    
7.5 Experiences of the Muslim Minority Rohingyas 
 The experience of the Muslim minority Rohingyas is based on systemic 
oppression, institutionalized discrimination, violence, and terror. When I interviewed the 
Rohingya refugees in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, I heard many sad stories, stories 
of unbearable loss, and sufferings. Most of the families of the Rohingya population have 
the experiences of being killed, raped, violated, injured, and evicted from their homeland 
(Contributor-12, Personal Communication September 4, 2019). Many members of the 
community whom I interviewed are yet afraid to expose their identity. They carry the 
deep trauma of what happened to them during the massive human rights violations by the 
military and the Buddhist extremists in 2017. The Rohingya community is yet to recover 
from such deep trauma, and they have no helpful resources to overcome from trauma.   
 Since 1990, the SPDC policies were aimed to reduce the presence of Muslims and 
their economic power in Rakhine. Therefore, SPDC adopted a series of unfair and 
religiously biased policies (World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People, 2017). 
The lands owned by the Rohingyas were forcefully occupied in Rakhine state and handed 
over to Buddhists as part of a massive settlement project aiming to implant the Buddhist 
families within the Muslim community to gain more control over the Muslim community. 
The colonization project provides each Buddhist family with 4 acres of land, a pair of 
bulls, and a house that is often built by Rohingyas through forced or unpaid labor (World 
Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People, 2017). That’s how the Rohingyas are 
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economically crippled down through the state-sponsored discriminative legal system. The 
potential power base of the Rohingya minorities is the religious platform for their 
unification, which is systematically targeted for elimination by the military Junta, 
Buddhist nationalists, and the government. The religious rights of the minorities, 
including Rohingyas, are rigorously violated. The military forcefully bulldozed many 
religious and academic institutions. Even cemeteries, monuments, and holy sites are 
deliberately destroyed across the country (Zawacki, 2012, pp.18-23). The denial of access 
to education over the period kept the majority of the Rohingyas illiterate that adversely 
affected them economically and politically. Thereby, their effective leadership could not 
develop.   
While talking with the Rohingyas and the international staff who are working 
with them, I came to know many facts about the living conditions of the Rohingyas 
before and after the pathetic event of 2017. It was heartbreaking to know that they are not 
allowed to access public education and government healthcare facilities. Every year many 
children in the Rohingya community grow up without having any education. Even for 
emergency healthcare, they need to travel to other towns, whereas the government health 
center is near to their home (Contributor-12, Personal Communication September 4, 
2019). They are not allowed to read and write in their own language in any school in 
Myanmar. Even if they are allowed to study in a private school, they have to follow 
Burmese books and language as a learning medium. The lack of education did not allow 
the Rohingyas to develop credible leadership.  
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The Rohingya community also faces economic suppression and exclusion. They 
are not allowed to join in government jobs and many business opportunities and 
privileges. They need to pay extra money than the Buddhists to avail of a business 
permit, and they need to pay more tax than the Buddhists. More so, the Rohingya 
businessmen need to pay enticements and illegal tolls to the military and the government 
officials for running their business (Contributor-13, Personal Communication September 
4, 2019). Rohingyas are not only discriminated economically, but they are also barred 
from performing their religious rituals. They are not allowed to build new mosques as 
they require, and they are not allowed to celebrate religious festivals without the 
permission of the local authority. They cannot even marry without the consent of the 
local government. A Rohingya family told me that they need to pay extra money to talk 
to their family members living abroad. The Rohingyas cannot obtain a passport to travel 
overseas. They sometimes get a passport by paying huge bribes, or often they collect a 
false Bangladeshi passport by paying huge money to related authority (Contributor-12, 
Personal Communication September 4, 2019). The Rohingyas have been experiencing 
such difficult living conditions for many decades. 
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Chapter 8: Factors Responsible for Communal Tension between the Buddhists and 
The Rohingyas 
Since the beginning of the military rule, many socio-economic and political 
factors set the stage for the ongoing ethnic conflict between the Buddhists and the 
Rohingyas. Often these tensions led to violent conflicts and resulted in mass human rights 
violations, killings, rape, and evictions. Overtly, the Myanmar Rohingya crisis labeled as 
ethnic, religious conflict, but in reality, the causes of the conflicts are extended far 
beyond that. The internal power dynamics between the parties involved in the conflict 
and the greed for state power attracted many vested groups into the Rohingya conflict. A 
detail investigation is needed from neutral perspectives to analyze each factor separately 
to diagnose the leading causes that are fueling the conflict supporting narratives. For a 
better understanding of the reasons that are responsible for the communal tension 
between the Buddhists and the Rohingyas, the relevant factors are discussed in 
subsequent paragraphs. 
8.1 Threat to Buddhist Religious Legacy 
Buddhist extremist groups have historically experienced their inclination towards 
state power; therefore, imagining themselves away from the power circle is quite tricky. 
Ironically, this aspiration for power has deviated them from the traditional peaceful 
teaching of Buddhism. The ambition for power entrapped the Buddhist extremist groups 
for exploitation by the military, and now it is hard for the monks to separate themselves 
from the power cycle. The Buddhist extremist groups are aware of their power to 
influence Myanmar society, and they believe that by utilizing this religious power, they 
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are capable of driving the society towards any direction. However, they are also aware of 
the deep-rooted military influences in all spheres of Myanmar society. They probably 
understand that the military systemized the country in a way that, without their support, 
none can emerge as a single power, and the religious are no exception in the reality of 
Myanmar. 
 The Buddhist extremist groups ideologically view themselves as the only 
guardian of Myanmar society because of the historical implications of Buddhism in 
Myanmar. According to Myanmar demography, Buddhists are the unanimous majority, 
and no other religion is even near to them in number. However, it was only the Muslim 
rulers who have ruled some part of Myanmar, the Arakan (present Rakhine). That is the 
only experience the Buddhists have of being ruled by the Muslims. Therefore, when the 
Rohingya population in Rakhine rose above 30%, the Buddhist extremists got concerned 
about the rise of Muslim minorities in Arakan, though overall, in Myanmar, Muslims are 
only 3.7%. There is no justifiable cause for getting worried about the demographic 
change of the Rohingyas. What concerned them most is the emergence of Rohingyas as 
financial elites in the Rakhine, who own the major business centers, and overall 
economic conditions of Muslim Rohingyas are better than the Buddhists. The Buddhist 
extremists presented an easy solution to deal with the situation, which is to evict all 
Rohingya Muslims and acquire their businesses and wealth for Buddhists (Zawacki, 
2012, pp.18-22). These served two purposes: first, reduce the Muslim population in the 
Rakhine state and, second, eradicate the economic disparity. 
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8.2 Legislative propositions - Institutionalization of Buddhist Nationalism 
Another significant factor that instigated the communal tension further is the 
legislative initiative campaigned by the Buddhist extremist groups to promulgate the 
"Laws for the protection of the Race and Religion" by Myanmar parliament. The law was 
initially drafted and propagated by the Buddhist nationalist groups like the 'Ma BA Tha' 
and '969', and they gathered 2.5 million signatures in favor of the law through a 
nationwide campaign. In June 2013, Aswin Wirathu first introduced the draft of the bill 
in a monk's conference in Yangoon. Later, in November 2014, the president submitted 
the law to the parliament (Walton, McKay & Kyi, 2015, p.37). This law deals with 
religious conversion, interreligious marriage, population control, and polygamy. 
According to the law, Buddhist women need to seek legal permission from local 
authorities if they want to marry someone from another religion. If a non-Buddhist man 
wants to marry a Buddhist girl, then he has to convert to Buddhism. No Myanmar citizen 
is allowed to marry more than one woman so long as the first wife is not legally separated 
or dead. Anyone failing to abide by the law is subject to 10 years of imprisonment 
(Walton & Hayward, 2014, p.16). 
It was quite clear to many people in Myanmar that the "Laws for the protection of 
the Race and Religion" is a discriminatory law, which mainly targeted the Muslim 
minorities. Many scholars and the civil society of Myanmar viewed the law as 
detrimental to communal harmony. The Buddhist nationalists initiated the law to check 
the population boom of the Muslims in the Rakhine state. Most women organizations in 
Myanmar protested against the law and claimed that the bill would undermine the rights 
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of women to choose their religion and husband.  Many human rights organizations 
condemned the act because it violates the religious rights of men and women in Myanmar 
(Watson and Hayward, 2014, P.17). The "Laws for the protection of the Race and 
Religion" had created massive resentment among the Muslims minority Rohingyas as 
they found it discriminatory and undignified. The law contributed to further worsening 
the inter-communal tension in Myanmar. Myanmar Civil Society Organizations (CSO) 
formally complained against the law. They claimed that the law is contradictory to the 
Myanmar constitution, which stated, "the Union shall not discriminate any citizen of the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, based on race, birth, religion, official position, status, 
culture, sex and wealth" (Kayshap, 2014). However, the Buddhist extremist groups 
thanked the government for promulgating the "Laws for the protection of the Race and 
Religion." They claimed that the law was enacted to safeguard the welfare of Buddhist 
women and Buddhism. 
The drafting of "Laws for the protection of the Race and Religion" by the 
Buddhist extremists and the government's initiative to pass this law cautioned Myanmar 
civil society and liberal Buddhists about the intertwinement of Buddhist extremists and 
the military-backed government. Later, such cooperation between Buddhist extremists 
and the government proved destructive through the incidents of mass human rights 
violations in 2017 and onward. 
8.3 Denial of the Citizenship Rights to Rohingyas 
Since the independence, Rohingyas were not treated on the basis of equity and 
59 
 
 
fairness due to their religious and biotic differences. However, in the constitution of 
1948, Rohingyas were treated as citizens of Myanmar. In the new constitution of 1974, 
their status subsequently downgraded. Finally, the citizenship act of 1982 enacted by the 
military junta denied citizenship rights to the Rohingyas, which rendered them stateless 
(Zawacki, 2012, pp.18-20). The denial of citizenship rights has taken away all the legal 
protection that they had in the 1947 constitution. The military junta stripped the 
citizenship rights with the intention of the final elimination of the Rohingyas. When their 
citizenship rights denied, the Rohingyas became vulnerable for exploitation, inhuman 
treatment, and they are unable to seek any legal protection domestically and 
internationally. The situations have not changed at all since the violence of 2017. 
According to the UN international independent Fact-Finding Mission report of 2019, 
"The Government of Myanmar has made no progress towards addressing the underlying 
structural discrimination against the Rohingya by amending the discriminatory laws, 
including the 1982 Citizenship Law. State policies that impose and force Rohingya to 
accept national verification cards (NVCs) have intensified. The Rohingya continue to 
perceive the NVCs with skepticism due to their history as a tool of persecution, having 
been used to disenfranchise and "other" them from the rest of the population (United 
Nations Human Rights Council, 2019). NVC is widely known as a political tout attempt 
of the Myanmar government to trademark the Rohingyas as outsiders in Myanmar 
(Contributor-14, Personal Communication, September 4, 2019). 
8.4 Disparity in Economic Status 
Throughout the British colonial era, the ethnic minority groups got more 
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privileges and opportunities than the majority Buddhist population, which helped to uplift 
the socio-economic conditions of the ethnic groups, including the Rohingyas. Therefore, 
many Rohingyas in Rakhine state could acquire more wealth and establish business 
centers, while the Buddhists were subject to deprivation from many employment and 
financial opportunities. That set the foundation of economic disparity between the 
Buddhists and the Rohingyas. However, during the military rule, the Rohingya 
businessmen faced numerous challenges due to discriminatory policies, which diminished 
their economic solvency at greater length. Again, as the Rohingyas were not allowed to 
join the government services, they mostly got involved in farming, which gave them 
solvency and better financial condition than many Buddhists. Another significant aspect 
that contributed to the economic disparity between the Buddhists and the Rohingyas is 
the higher birth rate of the Rohingyas. Most Rohingya families have more family 
members than most Buddhist families. As the number of earning members in Rohingya 
families is more, they ultimately earn more.  Buddhist extremist groups magnified the 
issue of this economic disparity in the Rakhine state and used it to mobilize the majority 
Buddhists in the anti-Muslim campaign.  
The '969' movement twisted the real fact and propagated that the Rohingyas are 
investing their money for converting the Buddhists into Islam (Fink, 2009, pp.239-240). 
Also, the '969' movement urged the Buddhists to boycott the business centers owned by 
the Rohingyas, which crippled down the Rohingyas economically. In reality, there was 
no single incident of such conversion through monetary benefits; a few conversions took 
place only through interfaith marriage. Moreover, the Rohingya businessmen need to pay 
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more taxes than the Buddhists and more undocumented illegal tolls and bride to local 
authorities to retain their business permit. Despite such oppressions, the Rohingya 
businessmen often donate to the local monastery and other religious rituals of the 
Buddhists (Contributor-15, Personal Communication, September 5, 2019). 
8.5 Perceived Financial Benefits for the Buddhist in Anti-Rohingya Narratives 
During recent crackdown against the Rohingyas in Rakhine, mostly the military 
and the Buddhist extremists' groups participated in the violence (Contributor-15, Personal 
Communication, September 5, 2019). The most worrying fact is that many lay people of 
Buddhist majority also participated in the violence. What was their motivation for such a 
genocidal act? The motivation lies in the anti- Rohingya narratives preached by the 
Buddhist extremist leaders. The first motivation they preached is that when the Muslim 
business centers are boycotted, then the Buddhist business centers will be able to make 
more profits. Their second motivation was when Rohingyas are evicted from their lands, 
farms, and business center; those will be allotted to Buddhist locals. Their third 
motivation was those who are participating in violence against Rohingyas are serving the 
legacy of Buddhism, and therefore they will be spiritually rewarded (Contributor-16, 
Personal Communication, September 5, 2019). Besides the motivational factors, some 
Buddhists took it as an opportunity to gain the trust and confidence of the ruling class, 
which they might utilize later for their gains. 
8.6 Denial of Access to Basic Amenities for the Rohingya 
Under the structured discriminatory government systems, Rohingyas are largely 
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denied from many basic amenities, like education, healthcare, housing, and many other 
social opportunities (Contributor-17, Personal Communication, September 5, 2019). 
Since the beginning of military rule, the Rohingyas started facing discrimination and 
systemic oppression. Over time, as the military rule entrenched more and more deeply 
inside Myanmar society, the Rohingyas experienced a greater degree of suppression and 
discrimination. The Rohingya youths were denied education since the military rule. In 
postcolonial time, the Rohingyas had their textbooks written in native language and 
schools, but with the military rule, they were compelled to read the books that are written 
in Burmese language (Contributor-17, Personal Communication, September 5, 2019). 
Later in the 90s, Rohingyas are not allowed to go to a government school or university. 
Similarly, the Rohingyas experienced discrimination in healthcare also. They are not 
permitted to receive healthcare services in public healthcare centers. Even if they visit 
private hospitals, they need to pay more and receive abusive words and poor services. 
Rohingyas also face hard restrictions on their movement. They are not allowed to visit 
other provinces or towns. The Rohingyas cannot apply to government jobs due to 
discriminatory policies, though many of them had government jobs before the military 
rule. They need to comply with discriminatory government instructions if they want to 
run a business center or shop. However, the Rohingyas are not allowed to do business in 
other provinces, but they can do business in Rakhine state but have to pay higher taxes 
(Contributor-18, Personal Communication, September 6, 2019). Rohingyas also face 
restrictions on their marriage. They need to take permission from the local authority to 
get married. However, the permissions are rarely granted.  
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8.7 Alignment of Buddhist Nationalism in State Politics of Myanmar and Anti-
Muslim Narrative 
As previously mentioned, Buddhism had been influencing Myanmar politics since 
long before the colonial era. During the British rule and Japanese occupation, the 
influence of Buddhism in politics was greatly diminished, but since independence in 
1948 until today, each government placed higher importance on Buddhism as a key pillar 
to Myanmar national identity (Jurgensmeyer, 2010,pp.262-273). Most governments 
patronized Buddhism to keep the support of the majority Buddhist population on their 
side. Especially the military painted their image as the custodian of Buddhism in 
Myanmar by sponsoring Buddhist nationalism. Thereby Buddhism reemerged as an 
ideological and philosophical guardian of state politics in post-independent Burma, but 
the rights of the religious minority groups were undermined to a great extent (Arai, 
2013). After independence, the U Nu regime intertwined Buddhism with state politics 
and governance by placing Buddhism at the high status of all state affairs and, at the 
same time, suppressing other religious minorities. The regime allocated much of its 
resources for promoting Buddhism by sponsoring traditional Buddhist cultures, 
meditation programs, and organizing international seminars for Buddhist monks. 
Following the path of ancient Buddhist kings, U Nu proved him as a dedicated soul for 
Buddhism (Fink, 2009, p.21). 
The priority and level of attention given to Buddhism were reflected through 
subsequent government policies and development agendas, which created significant 
resentment among the religious minority groups. The subsequent military governments 
after the U Nu regime utilized these resentments to overshadow the mismanagement in 
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Myanmar's socio-economic and political affairs. The military adopted the anti-Muslim 
narrative to depict the Muslim minority Rohingyas and other non-Buddhists as a barrier 
in attaining the purity of homogenous Burmese national identity, the identity that is based 
on Buddhism (Long, 2013, pp.79-94). The anti-Muslim narrative helped the military to 
keep the communal tension alive. The military found the Rohingyas most appropriate for 
incriminating because of two reasons: First, they allied with the British colonial power, 
which dehumanized the Buddhists, and second, they do not conform to Buddhism, which 
is viewed as a threat to Buddhist legacy in Myanmar. These two reasons helped the 
military and the Buddhist nationalists to develop a perception of 'Other' and inspired the 
majority Buddhists to disassociate them from mainstream society. This helped to create 
the anti-Muslim narrative and led the government, military, and the Buddhist nationalists 
to adopt the exclusion policy for the Rohingyas (Schober, 2011). The military's such 
effort planted the seeds of Buddhist nationalism, which later surfaced in violent forms 
and engulfed the secular democratic vision of Myanmar. 
Another significant evidence that indicates government alignment with the 
Buddhist Nationalists is the governmental reforms throughout the military rule, which 
institutionalized the discrimination and oppression against the religious minority groups, 
especially the Rohingyas. The Interfaith Marriage act, Religious conversion law, and 
Polygamy law are some of such discriminatory laws. As previously mentioned that the 
bills for these laws were drafted by extremist entities like '969' and 'Ma Ba Tha' and then 
given to the government to pass through the parliament. Accordingly, the president 
submitted the bills to Parliament. Another evidence of the government's patronization of 
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Buddhist nationalism is the immunities enjoyed by the extremist groups in propagating 
hate speech as part of the anti-Muslim narrative. Under the military rule, when all the 
political parties were subject to huge restrictions, the extremist groups conducted 
countrywide rallies, processions, and meetings without any hindrance (Coates, 2013, 
pp.1-3). Even when the Buddhist nationalists committed violence and destruction of 
properties against the Muslims, instead of protecting the Rohingyas, the military assisted 
the extremists in human rights violations. Moreover, the government often tried to protect 
the extremists through their official statement, for example, the minister of religious 
affairs denied the issues of hate speeches and claimed that those speeches are, "about 
promoting love and understanding between religions... It is impossible that he (i.e., 
Wirathu) is inciting religious violence" (Marshall, 2013).  
The entire Myanmar history in the colonial period and the post-independence time 
is the history of nationalist's narratives that sharply divided the society through 
discriminatory acts against the minorities. The triangle relationship between the military, 
the government, and the Buddhist extremist groups facilitated the development of violent 
discourses for anti-Muslim narrative. Among these three entities, the military assumed 
the led role for excluding the Muslim minority Rohingyas, where the government and the 
Buddhist extremists engaged in containing the society through the magnified fear and 
insecurities of losing the legacy of Buddhism. At the pinnacle of such a nationalist 
movement, the discriminatory citizenship act was promulgated in 1982, which allowed 
the Buddhist extremists and the military to set the stage for ethnic cleansing. 
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Chapter 9: Relationship between the Buddhists, the Rohingyas, Myanmar 
Government, and the Military 
Throughout Myanmar's history, all the development of religious nationalism has 
neatly integrated the Buddhist nationalists, the government, and the military to achieve a 
tragic convergence. Over time, the military, the government, and the Buddhist extremists 
surfaced as anti- Muslim entities. In Myanmar, the prolonged military rule crippled the 
traditional social structure and thereby made it difficult to imagine a civil society or the 
government free from military influence or military integration. Over time, the military 
became entrenched deeply in the societal structure of Myanmar. The military, the 
Buddhist community, and the government combined in creating a narrative of "Us" vs. 
the Rohingyas while launching the anti-Rohingya campaign. Therefore, it is imperative to 
study the relationship of the Rohingyas with Myanmar Buddhists, government, and the 
military to understand the transition and development of their relationships. Therefore, in 
this particular section, the context of rising Buddhist nationalism and existing 
relationships between the different groups involved in the Rohingya crisis are examined. 
While discussing the relationship between the groups, the discussion will start with the 
relationship between the most influential groups, like the military, and the Buddhist 
extremist groups and then progress with the least powerful groups, like the relationship 
between the Rohingyas and Myanmar civil society. 
9.1 Relationship between Myanmar Military and the Muslim Minority Rohingyas 
During the Junta rule in Myanmar, all the governments have utilized the threat of 
a Muslim invasion to stir up Buddhist nationalist sentiment. Historically, when there are 
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protests against the regime due to financial mismanagement, corruption, or the price hike 
of commodities, the anti-Muslim issues use to surface (Fink, 2019, p.239). The 
government and the military get much involved in the anti-Muslim issue, and state-
sponsored media focuses on the problems so that the attention of the masses is 
intentionally diverted from the real-life problem of Myanmar citizens. In July 1988, after 
student demonstration in Rangoon against the Junta regime, leaflets were unexpectedly 
found in the town 'Taunggyi' and other places of Myanmar where anti-military feelings 
were rising. The Buddhist extremist groups claimed that the leaflets were written by the 
Muslims to inspire fellow Muslims to marry Buddhist women (Fink, 2009, p.240). As a 
result, a violent Muslim-Buddhist communal riot broke out, and the business center and 
house owned by the Muslims were attacked and robbed. Similar kinds of leaflets 
appeared several times in the past, more specifically in October 1996 in Rangoon, when 
leaflets appeared that propagated the Muslim plans of taking over the Buddhist 
community. Most of the Buddhist community reacted violently after seeing the leaflets, 
while liberal Buddhists viewed the incident as an attempt by the Buddhist extremist 
groups to incite communal violence (Fink, 2009, pp.240-244). However, this incident 
inflicted bitterness in the relationship between the Buddhists and the Rohingyas. 
It is a common perception that there are "two governments" in Myanmar, the 
civilian, and the military. As this is the case, it is not clear who has taken over the role of 
"protector of the religion," which used to be the role of the king. As the majority of the 
voters belong to the Buddhist community, the rulers need to convince the voters that the 
candidate is the right person to rule the country and to protect the religion. As Sitagu in 
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his sermon is encouraging the military to go out and fight for the country and the religion, 
he seems to be giving this role to the military leaders (Johannessen, 2018). With this 
development, it could be argued that the Senior General is trying to brand himself, maybe 
not as a king, but as the next best thing, as Prime Minister. As the election gets closer, 
this can prove as good tactic for him as the military is now enjoying an enormous rise in 
popularity after their expulsion of the Rohingyas (Paddock, 2017). Frydenlund (2015) 
also suggested that the military's actions in the Rakhine state could be seen as a morbid 
part of a long-term electoral campaign. I also suggest that the military might be using the 
protectionist agenda of the Ma Ba Tha and associated monks, and combining it with their 
own form of nationalism. Even if the Ma Ba Tha itself is not concerned with the 
nationalist aspects, the military can use the support of this organization to claim that the 
generals will protect the religion, as suggested by Frydenlund (2015).  
In light of the above, another essential aspect of the power dynamics of the 
Myanmar military needs to be discussed to understand how the military impact the fate of 
Rohingyas. Myanmar military is the sole power of the country, and they control every 
aspect of citizens' life through extensive surveillance and monitoring. Myanmar military 
ranked 37 out of 137 countries in the world as a military power (Global Fire Power 
Index, 2019). Large numbers of the population are linked with military service directly or 
indirectly. The 25% reserve seat in the parliament allows them to steer the country's 
policy towards the direction they want. The military also owns and maintains huge 
businesses and contributes a substantial portion of the national revenue, which enhances 
their influence over the business community in Myanmar. More so, the military has 
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business ties with many international companies, which can effectively obstruct any 
global initiative against the Myanmar military. Since the military rule of 1962, the 
Myanmar military has ruled the country for decades. They have extended their influences 
deeper inside all sectors, societies, economies, and politics of Myanmar. Civil society and 
political parties are unable to alter the fate of Myanmar towards a progressive democratic 
country due to prolonged military rule. 
9.2 Relationship of the Rohingyas with the Myanmar Government 
Except for the post-independence first government, the Rohingyas were subject to 
ill treatment by all successive governments. Since the start of the military rule until today, 
all the government policies promulgated against the Rohingyas have heavily impacted the 
Muslim minority Rohingyas. The citizenship act enacted by the military government in 
1982 paved the way for the systematic elimination of Rohingyas.  Along with the 
adoption of discriminatory citizenship law, Myanmar government also adopted the policy 
of "Othering" the Rohingyas through the anti-Muslim narrative. In 1989, a Myanmar 
national newspaper published fourteen articles titled, "we fear deracination!" that focused 
on the demographic threat of the Muslims to Buddhist legacy in Myanmar. The ministry 
of immigration and population also show a fear of others, through their use of an old 
colonial-era slogan: "The earth will not swallow a race of extinction but another will!" 
(Kyaw, 2013). Frydenlund (2015) writes of how Muslims today are portrayed as 
terrorists, associated with Islamic global imperialism. The connection to the perceived 
international global threat has conveniently taken root in local competitions for power in 
Myanmar (Frydenlund, 2015, p.3). Schissler, Walton, and Thi (2017) used interviews of 
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Myanmar nationals to show the prejudice and mentality that exists regarding Muslims 
and Islam. The article explains how everyday customary actions that is dependent on an 
ability to see other people as monsters rationalize the practices of violence (Schissler, 
Walton & Thi, 2017, p.377). 
From a historical perspective also, we can see the events following the Japanese 
occupation cemented the divide between the Buddhists and the Rohingyas. The attempts 
at unifying the nation through Buddhism often saw the Rohingya portrayed as Bengalis 
and outsiders, and later as illegal citizens from 1948 and onward (Tonkin, 2018, pp.226-
237). Not recognizing Rohingya as an ethnic group in the constitution solidified the want 
for separatism for the Rohingya people. This decision also signals that the state sees them 
as illegal immigrants. Connecting the idea of separatism to Muslim terrorists abroad has 
alienated the Rohingya from Myanmar and given room for Muslim political and military 
groups (Yegar, 1972, p.97, 110-112). 
In the crisis in Rakhine State, the act of "alienation" is twofold. On the one hand, 
it separates the Rohingya Muslims from the Rakhine Buddhists, and on the other, it 
groups all Muslims together (Schonthal, 2016, p.238). Schonthal (2016) refers to the 
"Muslim-Buddhist" framing of the conflict, writing that “the recent violence is 
interpreted not as much as a conflict between certain communities of Buddhists and 
Muslims, but between Buddhist and Muslims writ large, or between Buddhism and 
Islam” (Schonthal, 2016, p.238). 
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It is pertinent to discuss the existing power dynamics of the Myanmar government 
in the context of the Rohingya crisis. The Myanmar government can be compared with a 
parasite (an organism that lives on the surface of another living organism), which relies 
on others for their survival.  The leading political parties are controlled by rules and 
regulations promulgated by the military Junta. The civilian government aimed to move to 
democracy since 2011, but in reality, the form of government introduced by the military 
junta is a mixed dictatorship. The military ensured fixing strings on the government so 
that they could effectively control the country's political and economic power. While the 
government alignment with the military makes them a powerful entity in Myanmar, it is 
evident that the government is unable to act independently, and they appear powerless 
without the support of the military. 
  As the government and the military share common ideological approaches 
towards the Rohingya minorities, they both maintain the mutual responsibility towards 
each other to accomplish the goals in marginalizing the Rohingyas. Aung San Suu Kyi, a 
Noble Lauriat and the leader of NLD, is a prominent figure in Myanmar politics but 
became a puppet of the Myanmar military. She advocated for the military during the 
ongoing Rohingya genocide in 2017, which diminished her image as a democratic leader. 
It is a fact that the political parties in Myanmar became handicapped due to military 
intimidation and control. 
In the end, it is necessary to mention that distinct power inequality prevails among 
the Buddhist nationalists, and the ruling class who are driving the anti-Muslim narrative, 
and the Rohingyas are the victim of such narrative. The military, government, and 
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Buddhist extremist groups maintain a classical power-sharing relationship and can 
exercise their power to create any narrative in any form that suits their interests and 
makes that narrative believable (Foucault, 1978). In the present context of Myanmar 
hybrid democratic system, the Buddhist extremist groups who have the support of the 
military and the government enjoy more power and freedom than the Muslim minority, 
Rohingyas, who are bounded with strict restrictions and constantly dehumanized 
(Contributor-18, Personal Communication September 6, 2019). This ongoing 
phenomenon of power inequality established the right of the Buddhist extremist groups to 
suppress and annihilate the less powerful Rohingyas, followed by ethnic cleansing. 
9.3 Inter-Ethnic Relationship between Buddhists and the Rohingyas 
In Myanmar, the Buddhists and the Muslim minority Rohingyas have coexisted 
together for many decades. There were few incidents of the communal clash between the 
Buddhists and the Muslims in different junctures of Myanmar history, but overall, both 
religious groups lived in communal harmony during most of the period of their account 
until recent tension (Thompson, 2013). Even after independence, the Muslim community 
was free to practice their religion and allowed to access all the benefits like other citizens. 
In the post-independence socio-economic context, both the communities lived peacefully. 
The post-independent new government paved the way for the peaceful coexistence of 
majority and minority communities through the first constitution. However, such peaceful 
coexistence was disrupted as the military took over the state power. Since the first 
military coup in 1958, the rift has continued between the two ethnic groups. The military 
played a key role in propagating the anti-Rohingya narrative.  As the military leadership 
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created a roadmap for the continuation of military rule for a prolonged period, they 
adopted the 'Divide and Rule' policy by propagating religious tensions between the 
Buddhists and the Rohingyas. The military aimed to keep the communal tension alive so 
that they could justify their presence in national politics and state power.  
Despite the rise of religious nationalism in Myanmar, liberal Buddhist 
communities also existed in Myanmar society. On many occasions, through press 
briefing, protest, and community dialogue, these Buddhist liberal groups oppose the 
nationalistic views of Buddhist extremist monks and the military. The liberal Buddhist 
groups prefer to practice the traditional role of Buddhism, and they are not in favor of 
being part of the state power cycle. According to U Gambira, a Saffron movement 
activist, the majority of Buddhist people are eager to perform their monastic role and 
social responsibilities and less interested in politics (Al-Jazeera, 2019). The liberal 
Buddhists prefer to adopt the nonviolent approach, and the Saffron revolution is a classic 
example of that. Though some liberal Buddhists might have some resentment on the 
Rohingyas (for the role the Rohingyas played during colonial age), they never support the 
exclusion policy for the Rohingyas (Ibrahim, 2016, p.70). Based on the actual teaching of 
Buddha, the liberal Buddhists want to coexist peacefully with other people living in 
Myanmar. The liberal Buddhists are aware of the rise of Buddhist extremism in 
Myanmar. They are not happy about the falsification of the Buddhist scripture by 
Buddhist extremists to adopt violence (Contributor-11, Personal Communication, 
September 4, 2019). However, they are not able to oppose it forcefully due to the military 
and government’s alignment with Buddhist extremist groups.     
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Due to the nationalist propaganda of the Buddhist extremists, there is hardly any 
sympathy for the sufferings of the Rohingyas among the local Buddhists in Rakhines and 
other parts of Myanmar (Fink 2009, p.241). The military junta has been successful so far 
in creating a rift between different ethnic groups and in maintaining a warlike situation in 
Myanmar. The military junta systematically infused much intolerance and mistrust 
among the Buddhist majority and the Muslim minorities to promote communal tension.   
Buddhist nationalism seems to merge with, or present itself as, Myanmar 
nationalism. The rise of Buddhist nationalism greatly influences the relationship of 
Buddhists with the Rohingyas because, through Ma Ba Tha, the Buddhist extremists 
present Buddhism as an integral part of Myanmar nationalism. It is essential to 
understand how the Buddhist extremists construct the Muslim "Other" in Myanmar, 
which helps to understand the total gamut of the Rohingya conflict. In light of the 
narrative mentioned above and facts, it can be concluded that the Muslims who are 
different from the Buddhists/Burmese "Us" are seen as inherently violent and a threat to 
the peace of the country. Islam is also portrayed as a conquering religion, aiming to 
destroy Buddhism in Myanmar. Muslims are described as less than human, and any 
violent actions against them are, therefore, not an unwholesome act for the protection of 
the country and the religion. Violence is presented as a reasonable and necessary 
response to this threat. This ideology is preached directly by Sitagu to support the 
military actions against the Rohingyas, while Wirathu shows the need for violent acts 
indirectly to the Burmese Buddhist people (Gravers, 2015, pp.14-15). 
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9.4 Response of the Rohingyas in the face of mass violence and discrimination 
 Despite the difficult living conditions of the Muslim minority Rohingyas in 
Myanmar, they have not resorted to violent means or counter attacked the Buddhist 
nationalist movement to safeguard their rights. The only resistance surfacing in the name 
of Rohingya is the armed movement of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). 
They have a bare minimum number of members and weapons and do not have any 
significant connection or support from the greater Rohingya community (Contributor-12, 
Personal Communication, September 4, 2019). In fact, since the military rule, the 
Rohingyas are actually living under constant fear of the military brutality and media 
censorship, they were unable to build any non-violent campaign for the resistance against 
the Junta regime (Contributor 12, Personal Communication, September 4, 2019). 
Moreover, due to the government-imposed restrictions on the movements and the denial 
of freedom of speech and political rights, they found it difficult to organize any social or 
political movement to voice their demands or protest against the oppression and 
discrimination. As a result of the factors mentioned above, the Rohingyas still could not 
develop any credible political platform or leadership to raise their voices locally or 
internationally about the violence, discrimination, and denial they are facing over the 
years.  
In light of the above, to understand the interethnic relationship of the Rohingyas 
with the rest of Myanmar societies, it is imperative to study the existing power dynamics 
of the Rohingyas, the Buddhist extremist groups and Myanmar civil society, which are 
discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
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9.5 Power Politics and Interdependency of the Military, Government and Buddhist 
Nationalists 
 
If we create an index of the power status of stakeholders in Myanmar Rohingya 
conflict, we can find that the Military will rank 1st, Buddhist extremist groups in 2nd, 
Myanmar government will rank 3rd, and the civil society at the 4th position. Though the 
power differences exist between groups involved in the Rohingya conflict, there also 
prevails mutual power interdependence between a few groups, like the Myanmar 
government, the military, and the Buddhist extremist groups. The military Junta and the 
Buddhist extremist groups both works for the same goal because the military supports the 
Buddhist extremist groups to accomplish their ultimate goal of staying in power. The 
Buddhist extremist groups want to mobilize the entire Buddhist community in their favor 
by igniting the anti-Muslim narrative. Similarly, the military also wants to preserve 
communal tension so that unified anti-military protest never gets momentum. These 
shared goals foster cooperation and support between the military and the Buddhist 
extremists. During the military rule, laypeople were not allowed to do processions on the 
street while the military not only allowed but also supported the Buddhist extremists to 
run the procession and campaigns against the Muslims (Contributor-11, Personal 
Communication, September-4, 2019). 
Due to prolonged military rule, Myanmar military has deeply rooted its power 
grip across the nation.  Therefore, the military wanted to remain in power probably for 
two reasons; one is to deter any initiative for the accountability of past genocidal acts by 
the security forces, and second, is to ensure the corporate financial interests of the 
military (Selth, 2018,pp-5-9).  For remaining in state power, the military needs the 
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support of the citizens, which is always critical for any military government. Therefore, 
to bring the people's support in their favor, the Myanmar military relies on Buddhist 
extremist groups, who have significant influence over the majority population. On the 
other hand, Buddhist extremist groups historically enjoy unchallenged absolute power 
over the majority Buddhist population because Buddhism has substantial control over 
Myanmar society. Ironically, prominent Buddhist leaders adopted the radical ideology of 
mono-ethnic religious nationalism and have developed significant intolerance about other 
religions. As the Buddhist extremist leaders realized that the moderate Buddhist monks 
often challenge their radical visions, therefore, they wanted to create conflict-supporting 
narrative against the Muslim minority Rohingyas, which helped them to unite all 
extremist powers in their favor. 
The radical Buddhist leaders realized that the military needs their support to gain 
popular support. In turn, they need the help of the military to restrain the influence of 
other religions in Myanmar. Myanmar government holds the constitutional powers and 
capable of making any policy and law. Therefore, the military and Buddhist extremist 
groups both need the government's support to annihilate the Rohingyas by promulgating 
discriminatory policies and laws.  On the other hand, the Myanmar government wanted to 
remain in power for which they need the cooperation of Buddhist religious leaders. The 
government also wanted to establish its credibility in ruling the country, which was not 
possible if the military does not cooperate and support the government because the 
military not only controls the parliament and local governments but also controls the 
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economy and politics of Myanmar. The government for its very existence, need to 
support the military and the Buddhist extremist groups. 
So, we can find that the top three stakeholders in Myanmar Rohingya conflict are 
mutually supported by each other, and all of them unite on the common issue of anti-
Rohingya narrative. To understand the base of such cooperation between these 
stakeholders, we also need to analyze the socio-political context of Myanmar. Myanmar 
is a society where religion is a prime social factor than anything else. In such a society, if 
the military wants to remain in state power, they need to prove them as indispensable for 
Buddhism. Therefore, the Myanmar military adopted the role of a custodian of 
Buddhism. In this regard, the first challenge was to clarify their role as custodian of 
Buddhism. The military leadership created a roadmap to portray themselves as custodians 
of Buddhism. First, they planned to project some threats against the legacy of Buddhism, 
and second, they wanted to act violently against that threat. To propagate the so-called 
threat, they utilized the Buddhist extremist leaders in determining the threats against 
Buddhism in Myanmar. The military-inspired the Buddhist extremist leaders to identify 
the Muslim minority Rohingyas as the threat to Buddhist legacy in Myanmar. Then the 
military took charge to neutralize that threat. Therefore, so long the threat to Buddhist 
heritage remains in Myanmar, the mutual support between the military and Buddhist 
extremist groups will stay strong, and together they will continue to share the state power. 
The Rohingyas being the victim of the above-mentioned power politics are unable 
to protect them from suppression and violence because of the considerable power gap and 
the absence of the rule of law. More so, due to the coordinated and institutionalized anti-
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Rohingya campaign by Buddhist extremists, sympathy is eroded from the minds of the 
majority of the Myanmar population (Fink, 2019, p.241). Therefore, much protest was 
not observed by civil society when the mass human rights violations and the genocide 
took place in 2017. Not only the Myanmar locals, but the international community also 
responded inadequately to stop the genocide. Ironically, after experiencing a sequel of 
violence, the Rohingyas failed to gain any tangible support from the international 
community to resolve the conflict or to end the oppression. The reason for such failure 
might be the lack of freedom of speech, heavy restrictions on political acts, the 
geopolitical interest of the superpowers, and constant state surveillance on the Rohingya.   
  The rise of the religious xenophobia became a driving force for perpetuating the 
chronic communal violence in Myanmar. The Myanmar government, the military, and 
the Buddhist nationalists are steering the Buddhist nationalism for their gains. The 
integration of these three most powerful forces of Myanmar in a common cause created a 
single powerful entity for the anti-Muslim force. The massive power structure, the strong 
support base, and religious mandate from majority Buddhists for this single anti-
Rohingya entity made it unstoppable and unquestionable. The military, by its power and 
capacity, became the slaying machine for this anti-Rohingya entity. As the military feels 
them more powerful due to the alignment with the government and the majority of the 
Buddhist community, the military commanders assume that they have the legitimacy to 
resort to some extreme actions towards the Rohingyas. From such understanding, the 
military, along with the Buddhist extremist groups, often adopted coercive measures to 
deal with the Rohingyas, and the government remained silent. 
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Chapter 10: The Impacts of Religious Nationalism on the Security Situations of the 
South Asian Region 
10.1 Buddhist Extremism in Myanmar and its Impacts on Neighboring Countries  
The rise of religious nationalism in Myanmar and its spillover impacts has greatly 
influenced the actions of nationalist groups in her neighboring countries. The interesting 
aspect of religious nationalism is that when the Buddhist extremist groups perpetrate 
violence on other religious groups, they never perceive the consequences on their own 
religious groups living in other countries as minority groups. They initiate a cycle of 
violence sometimes as part of a strategic move or as a random act without counting the 
consequences. When a particular religious majority group creates a narrative of 
"Othering," then it divides the society deeply. The religious nationalism promotes 
radicalism, which often leads to violence and thus creates mistrust, fear, and division. 
Such a division in society poses a serious threat to the country's law and order, which 
ultimately contributes to destabilizing the security situation of a region. 
The violent inter-ethnic religious tension in Myanmar created some spillover 
impacts over her neighbors. The apparent rise of religious nationalism in Myanmar has 
contributed heavily to boost the growth of religious nationalism in other parts of South 
Asian and Southeast Asian regions, like Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and 
China. It is quite evident that the Buddhist extremists of Myanmar have only 
concentrated on the geographical boundary of Myanmar, but also extended their vision 
regionally. The violence over the Muslim minorities in Myanmar by Buddhist extremists 
has created a twofold impact on her neighbors. In the Buddhist or Hindu majority 
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countries, a sharp rise of anti-Muslim narrative and religious violence over the Muslims 
are observed. There are numerous evidence that the extremist Buddhist groups in 
Myanmar contributed in many ways to the rise of Islamophobia in the neighboring 
countries, which gave rise to communal violence in many parts of Asia. On the other 
hand, in the Muslim majority countries, the Rohingya issue generated much agitation 
against the Buddhists and other religions, and some of them led to communal violence. 
The rise of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar has created huge resentment in the 
minds of the Muslims in Myanmar as well as the Muslims living in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
India, Thailand, and Sri Lanka who have the potential to react violently. These situations 
are likely to lead to the destabilization of the peace and stability of the South Asian 
region. The deterioration of the security situation in this region is a matter of grave 
concern for many reasons. First, due to poor socio-economic conditions the region is 
vulnerable to exploitation by the religious extremists, second, due to the lack of education 
and social awareness, people of this region often get wrongly motivated in the name of 
religion and participate in communal violence, and third, the weak social safety net and 
fragile social service structures are likely to collapse in the event of any serious 
humanitarian disaster. According to the UNHCR, the Rohingya refugee crisis already 
turned to a severe humanitarian disaster. The impacts of growing religious nationalism in 
Myanmar on her neighbors are evaluated in the subsequent paragraphs. 
10.2 The Influx of Rohingya Refugees and Security Threats for Bangladesh 
  Bangladesh is the worst affected country due to the xenophobic rise in Myanmar. 
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Because of the issue of the refugees, the diplomatic relationship between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar has deteriorated in recent years. In the last thirty years, the relationship was 
frequently affected by the 'push-in' and 'push back' of Rohingya refugees. In 2012, 
approximately 200,000 Rohingyas became refugees and sheltered in Bangladesh (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014). The relationship between both the countries had deteriorated 
further since August 2017, when more than 600,000 Rohingyas moved to Bangladesh to 
save their lives from the violence perpetrated by the Myanmar military and the Buddhist 
extremist groups (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018). The vast number of 
refugees created additional pressure on highly populated Bangladesh and the socio-
economic conditions of her citizens. The Myanmar military crackdown on Rohingyas in 
August 2017 generated much tension between the border guard forces of both countries. 
The influx of the refugees in bulk raises a security concern for Bangladesh because when 
the borders need to be open for humanitarian consideration, it becomes very hard for the 
border controlling authorities to establish controlled checking procedures. Such an 
inability to effective border control leaves the probability of foreign terrorists entering 
Bangladesh to destabilize the prevailing security situation. 
Bangladesh is the residence of 146 million Muslims, which is more than 90% of 
her population. Therefore, it was a challenge for the Bangladesh government to refrain 
the large Muslim population from retaliation on the Buddhist minority communities when 
the Muslim minority Rohingyas were killed, raped, and evicted from Myanmar. There 
was huge resentment among the Muslims in Bangladesh, and many Islamic organizations 
rallied on the street, condemning the genocide conducted by Myanmar.  Religion is such 
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a sensitive aspect of human life that it does not require any direct involvement or 
communication between the same religious groups to be mutually sympathetic. In the 
event of any communal violence in India toward the Muslims, there were immediate 
repercussions inside Bangladesh. On a few occasions, Hindu minorities living in 
Bangladesh had to suffer the consequences. Therefore, despite not having any regular 
relationship among the Rohingyas in Myanmar and the Muslims living in Bangladesh, 
the Islamic organizations and lay Muslims feel it their sacred responsibility to show 
sympathy and offer support to the Muslim minority Rohingyas. Due to the secular 
mindset of dominant liberal Muslims in Bangladeshi society, Islamic organizations could 
not utilize the Rohingya issue to destabilize the country's law and order. However, this 
kind of issue remains an internal security threat for the government. 
Bangladesh, since it is a highly populated Muslim country, has always remained 
vulnerable to the threats of Islamic extremist groups. The inferior economic condition, 
poverty, and lack of education make its population subject to exploitation by the Islamic 
extremists. In recent years the education rate has improved, and the country turned into a 
middle-income country, yet unemployment and illiteracy prevail in some parts of the 
rural population mostly. In the last few decades, the Middle East and Pakistan-based 
Islamic extremist groups tried in many ways to radicalize the Muslim community in 
Bangladesh but failed due to the long-practiced secular heritage of Bangladeshi people. 
Due to the influx of Rohingya refugees, there is a golden opportunity for the Islamic 
extremist groups to recruit their activists from the refugees who are desperately seeking 
means to survive. Bangladesh, with its limited resources, is certainly not capable of 
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managing vast numbers of refugees and thus requires proper involvement of the 
international community and their sustained support. If the international community fails 
to provide credible support to the refugees and arrange their immediate repartition, then 
the large number of Rohingya refugees will be vulnerable to exploitation by religious 
extremists. Such vulnerability of the refugees may seriously destabilize the security of the 
South Asian region. 
10.3 Rise of Buddhist Nationalism and Ongoing Violence in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka is the most impacted by religious violence in recent days. Following the 
violent conflict between Buddhists and the Rohingyas in Myanmar, religious tension has 
prevailed all over Sri Lanka since November 2017, which led to communal violence in 
southern Sri Lanka. Ten vehicles, 62 houses, and business centers were attacked; the 
Muslims owned the majority of them. The Sri Lankan government had to impose evening 
curfew to deal with the situation. The rise of Buddhist extremism in Sri Lanka is not an 
isolated event; the Buddhist nationalist groups of Myanmar have patronized the Buddhist 
radical groups of Sri Lanka. The prominent Buddhist extremist group of Sri Lanka is 
known as 'Bodu Bala Sena,' led by Kirima Wimalajothi, has posed a serious challenge to 
the Sri Lankan secular society (Schonthal and Walton, 2016, pp.81-115). The visit of 
radical Buddhist Monks Aswin Wirathu to Sri Lanka in 2014 and his address to Buddhist 
monks were mainly to propagate Islamophobia and create a regional platform for the 
anti-Muslim narrative. In his speech, Aswin Wirathu urged the monks to fight against the 
Muslims, mentioning the Muslims as a threat to Buddhism (Schonthal, 2016). The 
Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka has taken its extreme form. They are not only 
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propagating the anti-Muslim narrative, but they have also targeted the Christian 
population (7.9% of the total population) living in Sri Lanka. In 2014, the members of 
Bodu Bala Sena stormed the Holy Family church in Kandy district (Gravers, 2015, p.16).  
The impacts of such cooperation of Buddhist extremist groups are enormous in Sri 
Lankan society, and the violence carried out by the Buddhist extremists on the Muslims 
in 2017 is the outcome of such impacts. 
The rise of religious nationalism in Sri Lanka generated a cycle of violence and 
created a favorable condition for the different religious extremist groups to operate. The 
communal violence of 2017 was a clear indication of the level of mistrust created among 
the Buddhists and the Muslims, but the government did not address the issue adequately. 
The recent bomb blasts in Sri Lankan churches and hotels show the threat the country 
bears from the religious nationalists. On April 21, 2019, during the Easter Sunday 
celebration, three churches and four luxurious hotels in Sri Lanka were hit by a series of 
coordinated suicide bombing. The death toll raised to 258, including 46 foreign nationals, 
three police officers, and around 500 people were injured (Bruni, 2019). Such a terrorist 
attack in Sri Lanka destabilizes the country's security as well as the security of the South 
Asian region. 
10.4 The Rise of Ultra Hindu Nationalism in India 
The xenophobic rise in Myanmar has significantly influenced the political 
situation in India and helped to boost ultra-Hindu nationalism in India. The sectarian 
violence against the Muslim minority Rohingyas by the Myanmar military and Buddhist 
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extremist groups compelled them to take shelter in neighboring countries as refugees. A 
significant number of refugees moved to India for shelter, which reignited the Hindu 
nationalism and their anti-Muslim narrative and thus created political pressure on the 
government to push the refugees out of the Indian border. The government, on some 
occasions, expelled the refugees instead of providing them humanitarian support. On the 
other hand, the government action regarding the refugees disheartened the liberal Hindu’s 
and the Muslim sentiment in India.   
The Hindu nationalist groups view the Muslims in India as the "Others" who do 
not necessarily belong to the true identity of India. Since the ultra-Hindu nationalist party 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in India, the anti-Muslim narrative gained 
much momentum. The Hindu nationalist groups not only demean Muslims through hate 
speeches and social media campaigns, but they also force the government to enact anti-
Muslim policies. Accordingly, in 2018, the Indian immigration authority took the 
initiative to identify the illegal immigrants and deport them, which eventually targeted 
Muslims who had lived for decades in India, many for generations, and some who held 
government positions. According to the policy, illegal immigrants who are Muslims will 
be deported only, not the believers of other religions. The government initiative was 
allegedly part of the anti-Muslim campaign of ultra-Hindu nationalists backed by the 
ruling party BJP. The government initiative to enact policies that target the Muslims will 
create further resentment among the Muslims, which will boost the communal between 
the Hindus and the Muslims. Many political scholars in India view the rise of Hindu 
nationalism as a threat to the socio-political stability of India, which threatens the 
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national security of India as well and also the regional security of the South Asian region. 
There was lots of criticism throughout the first term of Indian Prime Minister Mr. 
Narendra Modi's government for human rights violations against the religious minority 
groups, the promulgation of discriminatory laws, and favoring the religious extremist 
groups. The controversial initiative of present BJP led government is the National 
Register of Citizens (NRC), which aimed to strip the citizenship status of religious 
minority groups. The NRC is a list of people who need to verify that they were living in 
India before March 24, 1971, the day before the independence of Bangladesh from 
Pakistan (Dutta, 2018). It is reported that the NRC is strictly implemented mainly in the 
Muslim populated provinces of India, like Asam and West Bengal, to reduce the number 
of Muslims living in India. The implementation of the NRC is widely viewed in India as 
a religious stance, and it is on the top priority of the Hindu Nationalist party, BJP. 
However, Indian people have elected the ultra-nationalist Hindu nationalist party, BJP, 
for the 2nd term to rule the country. This recent election result signifies the rising trend of 
religious nationalism that presently exists in India.   
10.5 The rise of Islamophobia in Other Neighboring Countries of Myanmar 
The rise of religious nationalism in Myanmar has created significant spillover 
impacts on her other neighboring countries, like Thailand and China. For a long, the 
Buddhist nationalist groups in Thailand and China have created an Anti-Muslim 
narrative, which was boosted recently following the Rohingya Muslim crackdown in 
Myanmar. There are more than 20 million Muslims live in China who is subject to state-
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sponsored negative media coverage of stereotyping Islam as a radical group (Luqiu and 
Yand, 2018, pp. 598-619). The millions of Muslims in Uighurs and Xinjiang are 
experiencing inhuman treatment by the state and the Buddhist religious communities. In 
2017, the Chinese government enacted a law to implement the ban on Burqas, veils, and 
beards, which created serious resentment among Muslims. Further resentment among the 
large Muslim community may flare up at any moment, which may lead to violent 
communal conflict. There is also a growing anti-Muslim sentiment in Southern Thailand, 
which often leads to Buddhist-Muslim sectarian conflict. 
The anti-Muslim narrative in Thailand has gained significant momentum in the 
last five years. The worldwide rise of Islamophobia has also influenced Thai society to 
adopt the anti-Muslim narrative. Though the experts' view that there is no substantial 
indication about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Southeast Asian region. The hate 
propagates against the Muslims indicate the growing prominence of religious extremism, 
which has become a significant challenge for the governments in the region.  The 
violence on Rohingyas failed to generate much sympathy from the people and 
governments in Southeast Asia because of anti-Muslim perception that overshadowed the 
humanitarian concern (Pathan, Tuansiri & Koma, 2018). Out of Thailand's 61 million 
populations, approximately 4 million are Muslims, who mostly live in the Southern 
border province. The rising Buddhist nationalists with their anti-Muslim narratives 
recently opposed the construction of any new mosques and a halal food production 
factory in the region. Even the teacher of public schools protested against the elementary 
school students wearing Hijab (Pathan, Tuansiri, Koma 2018). These kinds of prevailing 
89 
 
 
communal tensions may further escalate to violent conflict, which may destabilize the 
country’s law and order situation and may pose a threat to regional stability.    
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Chapter 11: Concluding Remarks and Possible Ways Forward: Recommended 
Directives for Resolution 
11.1 Concluding Remarks on Findings 
Throughout this study, the critical aspect that came up is the complex and 
seamless interrelation between religion and nationalism in Myanmar. Over the decades 
under the military sponsorship, some segments of the Buddhist community became 
extensively radicalized and established the most dominant Buddhist authority in 
Myanmar. While promoting the anti-Muslim narrative, these extremist Buddhist 
communities deviated from the traditional teachings and role of Buddhism and entangled 
religion with power politics. They have adopted violence as a means to attain their 
religious and political goals. To achieve the political goal, the extremist Buddhist monks 
compromised with the illegitimate military rule overlooking the massive human rights 
abuses and continuous denial of the citizens' rights in Myanmar. 
This thesis has emphasized the ongoing phenomenon of using Buddhism for 
xenophobic purposes in Myanmar by mobilizing the Buddhist population together 
centered on collective identity in religion. Buddhist extremists also created common fears 
and insecurities by portraying the Muslim minorities as a threat to the Buddhist legacy for 
uniting the Buddhist population. The Buddhist nationalists misinterpreted religious 
sermons, symbols, and teachings to attract people and to mobilize them towards a narrow 
path of Buddhist nationalism. Also, the extremist groups shrewdly linked Buddhism as 
the key to Burmese national identity to achieve national purity. In this process, they have 
undermined the traditional role of Buddhism, and it's teaching of compassion and 
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empathy, which immensely tarnished the peaceful image of Buddhism. Throughout this 
process of xenophobic rise, the Myanmar military has successfully utilized the influence 
of Buddhism on Myanmar society in its favor to legitimize their illegitimate rule. 
One thing that needs to be understood clearly is, the Myanmar military is unlike 
the traditional military of any other country. They have a deep influence in every sphere 
of the socio-political and economic aspects of Myanmar. The Myanmar military is the 
only military in the world that constitutionally holds 25% of seats in the national 
parliament. For a considerable period, the Myanmar military has been dealing with the 
political and economic power of the country. Therefore, they are less interested in 
distancing themselves from political power. 
Moreover, they are the controlling force for the entire legislative setup in 
Myanmar because the military officers also lead many semi-government offices. Even the 
military generals lead a few ministries of Myanmar. The local government systems in 
some areas are tied with military installations. The military has tightly integrated its 
functions with the local government system to control the root level state affairs, which 
have made it challenging to democratize the society.  In the process of doing so, they 
have developed a mutual relationship with the Buddhist extremist groups, who aspire to 
be a part of state power in Myanmar.  
The military has so far succeeded in legitimizing its rule by boosting the rise of 
religious nationalism in Myanmar. By positioning itself as the guardian of the Buddhist 
identity of the nation, the military validates its central role in Myanmar politics and 
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Myanmar society. But one of the negative consequences is that the military, through the 
same process of legitimization, can self-justify the actions of challenging, confronting, 
and eventually attacking the identity groups that are not Buddhist. Such justification sets 
the stage for the military and Buddhist nationalists to target the Muslim minority 
Rohingyas for ethnic cleansing in 2017. 
The Buddhist extremist groups are inspired by the historical legacy of Buddhism 
that had been close to state power for many centuries. Both the military and the Buddhist 
monks have adopted the anti-Muslim narrative that is capable of moving the laypeople 
through socio-political and religious motivation. Based on the anti-Muslim narrative, 
both the military and the Buddhist extremists created an environment of fear. They 
propagate the fear of losing the religious legacy of Buddhism and threat to national 
security, which mobilized the majority Buddhists to rally behind them. In this situation 
the Buddhist extremists targeted the Rohingyas as a scapegoat in achieving their interests. 
Even though the Rohingyas are living in Myanmar for many centuries and few were 
integrated into policymaking, the Rohingyas began to live under difficult living 
conditions since the start of military rule. Both the Buddhist extremists and the military 
established a cycle of expectation; the Buddhist extremists want the military to support 
them to fight against Rohingya. By doing so, they want to portray themselves as the 
guardian of Buddhism in Myanmar. On the other hand, the military has entrenched their 
power by propagating the exclusive Buddhist identity of the society through a close 
alliance with the nationalist Buddhist monks. 
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The military junta in Myanmar realized it would be easier for them to retain their 
power over a destabilized society rather than that of a stable society. They understood 
that the Rohingya issue was historically the most controversial in Myanmar society, and 
the Buddhist community always retained their reservations about the Rohingyas. The 
Myanmar military pragmatically coopted this issue to utilize it for gaining the faith of the 
majority Buddhist community who see Rohingyas as separatist and a threat to their 
religious dominance. On the other hand, the elected civil government and political parties 
understand the impacts of military influences all over the country, which compel them to 
consider the military as a partner for state power, not merely as a government organ. 
That's the reality in Myanmar politics. In the context of such power inequality, without 
the support of the military and religious clerics, it is hard for any government to survive. 
Global acceptance of Myanmar's present version of democracy and the economic 
interests of China and the USA further narrowed the scopes for effective communication 
between the groups involved in the Rohingya issue for a meaningful resolution of the 
conflict.    
Myanmar civil society is living under constant terror. The civil society is highly 
impacted by religious nationalism and prolonged military rule. Therefore, civil society is 
not capable of playing the traditional role as represented by a civil society elsewhere. The 
civil society has been experiencing violence and intimidation of the military since 1962. 
For a long time, they have been denied freedom in many spheres of life, including 
freedom of expression. People often become subject to military surveillance and 
interference. Press and the media experience strict censorship while voicing people's 
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opinions and ideas. The government has increasingly applied its overly broad and 
vaguely worded laws to detain, arrest, and imprison individuals for expressing their views 
on social media and taking part in nonviolent processions. Activists and journalists 
experienced enhanced scrutiny, heavy restrictions on media, shadowing, pressures, and 
harassment by the military or other law enforcing agencies. The increased surveillance of 
journalists created a fearful environment, which negatively impacted the country's media. 
Therefore, public participation in the socio-political issues became challenging, and thus 
government policies and actions hardly reflect people's will. More so, the huge power gap 
between government institutions and civil society created barriers for meaningful 
dialogue and other forms of communication.  
In the context of Myanmar conflict, where massive social injustice and power 
inequalities are prevailing, the opportunities for meaningful intergroup dialogues are 
often minimum. Mutually enhancing interaction between unequal powers is always 
challenging (Anastasiou, 2007, p.63). When the military alongside the government enjoys 
absolute power of controlling the socio-economic and political sectors, and when the 
Buddhist monks mutually support them, then it becomes challenging to make them listen 
to the voices of minorities when it comes to injustices.  More so, the intense surveillance 
and censorship on the press and media add barriers for civil societies, which made them 
unable to stand beside the minority groups and voice against discrimination and social 
injustices. Thus, in a massive institutional framework of systematic oppression, the 
Rohingyas find it very hard to empower themselves by gaining support and sympathy 
from both internal and external sources. 
95 
 
 
11.2 Possible Ways Forward 
As the prevailing human rights situation has turned to a humanitarian disaster, 
outside help required for bringing a constructive process that might be able to bring some 
way forward for resolving the conflict. The Rohingya crisis demands three-pronged 
attention: one, take immediate measures to initiate a meaningful dialogue with the donor 
countries, the UN, and the Bangladesh government to develop a roadmap to support the 
Rohingya refugees and ensure minimum living standard in the refugee camps. Two, 
tangible steps should be taken to exert diplomatic pressure on the Myanmar government 
to conform with the Kofi Anan Commission's recommendations and ensure a secure 
environment in the Rakhine province for the safe return of the refugees. Three, efforts 
should be taken to re-establish democratic norms, accountability, and communal harmony 
in Myanmar society. The reconciliation process should start immediately. In all these 
processes, the UN should take necessary steps to oversee the prevailing situation in the 
Rakhine state and ensure that the Myanmar government agrees to make appropriate 
arrangements to accommodate the Rohingyas in mainstream society with their rights 
fully recognized. In this regard, the Rohingya leadership should be consulted for any 
future steps that might be taken by the international community. 
According to the findings of the recent UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission 
Report on Myanmar, the Myanmar government failed to reform or amend the hostile 
policies regarding the Rohingyas, which led to the denial of their citizenship rights, 
dehumanization, and difficult living conditions. The government has not taken any 
credible measures to stop hate speeches against the Rohingyas, the continuation of ethnic 
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cleansing, mass human rights violations, and evictions from their own houses. The 
commission further asserted that the Myanmar government strengthened the conditions in 
the Rakhine state that led to ethnic cleansing. Therefore, there prevails a high risk of the 
recurrence of communal violence and genocidal acts. The commission also claimed that 
the Myanmar government yet had not shown any intent to stop, prevent, or investigate the 
genocidal acts that are perpetrated against the Rohingyas. In the end, the commission 
opined that considering the prevailing hostile environment maintained by the Myanmar 
government and its military, the voluntary, dignified and safe return of about one million 
Rohingyas would not be possible in the immediate future. Due to the stubborn attitude 
and non-cooperation of the Myanmar government with the international community, the 
mission is not even sure when the safe return of the Rohingyas can take place (United 
Nations Human Rights Council, 2019). In light of the facts mentioned above, it is quite 
clear that unless reasonable diplomatic pressure is exerted on the Myanmar government 
and its military, the situation will further worsen. 
Any comprehensive and credible initiative by the UN and the world community 
could tip the balance of power in the Myanmar Rohingya conflict, but unfortunately, that 
has not happened. Though numerous examples of such international initiatives are 
evident in the recent geopolitical context, the international community has shown 
considerable reluctance to invest in the Myanmar conflict. On the other hand, 
unconstitutional responses of the international community made the Rohingya Muslim 
minorities less powerful and more frustrated. Such a lack of confidence and mistrust 
among the low power groups will make them susceptible to any initiative for dialogue 
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unless sensible, honest approaches are not in vogue to resolve the conflict. The 
international community should exert pressure on the Myanmar government to 
implement the Kofi Annan Commission's recommendations at priority basis. However, 
the Anan commission report was largely rejected by the Buddhist extremist groups first, 
and eventually by the Myanmar government, blaming the commission for supporting the 
Rohingyas. While interviewing the Rohingyas, many of them mentioned that they do not 
want any monetary help from the international community; they want their rights back 
and want to live in peace. 
The experiences of the Buddhists and the Muslims are diverse and complex. Both 
sides developed a hostile relationship, and communication between them has been 
suspended. It is necessary to identify the existing communication challenges among the 
groups to move towards the resolution. Therefore, intergroup interaction between 
different groups needs to be initiated at multiple levels involving people from all spheres 
of society. The potential grounds for the interactions between different groups of 
Myanmar need to be identified and analyzed for possible outcomes through the 
interactions. Starting from the cultural interactions and exploring the education system, 
religious festivals, sports, and many other potential sectors for communication might be 
useful. It is essential to make sure that no initiatives are confined only to specific groups 
of people. The efforts should welcome teachers, farmers, community leaders, students, 
social workers, government employees, journalists, writers, and anyone who has the 
opportunity and potentiality to contribute to the resolution process. The dialogues 
between groups should start from the root level and then reach to the top, focusing on 
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expanding the knowledge about each other, opening up the information of each other, and 
exploring the visions of each other. The dialogue should also clarify the facts and 
assumptions that each side perceives each other. A deep understanding of each other will 
help to eliminate suspicion and mistrust; assisting each group in restoring trust within 
groups.  
The social dialogues need to be initiated countrywide by civil society. The UN, 
International NGOs, and peace groups can step in to assist the Myanmar civil society in 
providing moral and logistic support to initiate such dialogues. Myanmar civil society, 
academia, and scholars might need to build the structure to hold a countrywide dialogue. 
In these processes, the Rohingyas should ensure that ARSA suspends its operation, and 
the community should distance themselves from any armed activities. The UN country 
team and the diplomatic core working in Myanmar should take the lead role to mediate 
between the Buddhists and the Muslims living in Myanmar. Liberal Buddhist 
communities need to be included alongside the civil society to foster meaningful 
conversations between different groups on social inclusion and social justice for the 
minority groups living in Myanmar. It is essential to introduce intercultural training at an 
appropriate level to foster cohesion among the majority Buddhists and other religious 
minorities. The cross-cultural training may help both sides to understand each side's 
perspectives from cultural lenses. The study of commonalities and differences in food 
habits, dresses, and traditions will enable the groups to realize the sensitivity of each 
other thus becomes respectful to diversities. 
It is essential to introduce peace education in schools and at the community level 
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to instill tolerance, empathy, and compassion towards each other. For children and 
youths, peace education can be integrated with the school curriculum. For elders, peace 
education can be imparted through workshops, seminars, town hall meetings, and 
community clubs. Peace education should include aspects of cross-cultural 
communication, restorative justice, diversity, and gender equality. Peace education 
should also focus on nonviolence communication and non-violence movements across 
the world. Peace education should also focus on nonviolence communication and non-
violence movements across the globe. All ethnic minority groups should also have access 
to peace education. 
Myanmar should utilize its economic and cultural potentiality through a massive 
socio-political reform to achieve its democratic vision. Instead of being isolated from the 
international community, the Myanmar government, along with its citizens, should work 
to introduce democracy at the grassroots level of people's life. There is an urgent need to 
resume the function of democratic institutions and the social establishments, which were 
crippled during the prolonged military rule. Otherwise, in the future, it will be difficult to 
find any functional democratic institution in Myanmar. The citizens should not be kept 
deprived of interacting with global societies under the shadow of military surveillance. It 
is expected that the Buddhist communities in Myanmar soon will separate themselves 
from the influence of the Buddhist radical groups and will be able to uphold the 
traditional peaceful values of Buddhism. 
It is quite evident that without the initiatives of the international community, the 
intergroup dialogue will never be possible between the Myanmar governments, the 
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military, Buddhist extremist groups, civil societies, and the Rohingya minorities. 
Historically, the military and the Buddhist majority groups have never participated nor 
have been interested in any mediated dialogue. Therefore, third-party intervention to 
mediate the conflict is a necessity in the Myanmar context. That third party might be the 
UN or the international community who will be able to impose effective sanctions on 
Myanmar military and the government to comply with international human rights 
standards while dealing with the minorities. Unless the Rohingyas are given back their 
legal status, they will remain powerless and stateless, which will further complicate the 
crisis. More and more joint initiatives by international organizations and the civil society 
to hold dialogues between the communities of the Buddhist majority and Rohingya 
minorities can create a safe space for working together to resolve the conflict. Scholars 
from both sides can also engage in the reconciliation process by sharing the experiences 
of both sides of the conflict to help each side in healing the wounds of communal 
violence. The international community needs to come forward to help the Myanmar 
government and Rohingyas to hold dialogues in safe places out of Myanmar to resolve 
the conflict. 
The Rohingyas need to be empowered by providing legal and expert support so 
that they can effectively communicate their concerns and experiences about the conflict. 
Rohingya minorities also need to be supported to meet their basic needs, and they should 
be made aware of the rights so that they are able to report any discrimination and human 
rights violations appropriately. The access to voting rights might empower the minority 
Rohingyas to a greater extent. There is also a need to enable the liberal civil societies in 
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Myanmar so that they can raise their voice against institutionalized, systematic 
oppression against minorities, and call for ending social injustice. When the civil society 
is strengthened, it creates a space for intergroup dialogues between Buddhists and the 
Rohingyas. For empowering civil society to function effectively, the freedom of press 
and media and social justice needs to be ensured. In this regard, the international 
community may work with the Myanmar government utilizing diplomatic tools to 
enforce the rule of law and to ensure human rights for all the citizens of Myanmar. 
We need to ask the question of why the Myanmar government and military will 
comply with the international community's expectations. What will they get by stepping 
out of their positions and benefits? Especially when the military is worried about their 
fate due to their involvement in the past human rights violations. The fear prevails among 
the military men that if the military influence diminishes, they might be subject to trials 
and judicial procedures for their past crimes, which often motivate them to remain at the 
center of state power. Any international approach to Myanmar conflict should integrate 
the answers to these questions. Therefore, an essential aspect of the possible resolution is 
the provision of certain incentives for the Myanmar government and the civil society of 
Myanmar for their compliance with the international human rights standard. The 
incentive might be in any form. Some can be in the form of lifting sanctions and bans, 
some in the form of international recognition, while others may be in monetary form, Etc. 
For resolving the Rohingya conflict, we need to consider what should be done 
with the religious nationalism? How can the flame of religious nationalism be defused? 
There should be some credible steps to restore and highlight the traditional Buddhist 
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liberal ideology. The voices of the moderate Buddhist need to be included to project the 
peaceful nature of Buddhism. Support needs to be provided to the liberal Buddhists to 
facilitate the conversation with the majority Buddhist community, as well as similar 
discussion, should be initiated with other religions. Space should be created for the 
Buddhist nationalists to transform into a peaceful religious practice through religious and 
social motivation programs. International Buddhist and Muslim scholars should support 
the Buddhists and the Muslims in Myanmar to restore the peaceful traditional values of 
the respective religions.    
It is essential to hinder the support base of the Buddhist extremist groups by 
motivating their followers. In the Rohingya conflict, there are only a few people from the 
military, government, and the extremist groups are the masterminds. The rests are the 
motivated mass people or the people who are the beneficiary of the conflict. It is quite 
evident that in most conflicts, not all the people participate in violence, knowing the 
consequences. Most people perpetrate violence to obey orders or to maintain their 
association, like the soldiers of the Myanmar military, some of who have committed 
genocidal acts in the name of safeguarding the religion; again, some of them just 
performed the routine job. The hope is that the people who are utilized or wrongly 
motivated are subject to be changed through awareness. These people need to be made 
aware of the negative impacts of religious nationalism. More so, as Buddhism plays a 
central role in Myanmar society, therefore, to diminish the radical views of Buddhism, 
the actual teachings of Buddhism need to be established in society. The traditional 
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peaceful practice of Buddhism will help the community to come out from the vicious 
cycle of hate revenge and violence. 
  The UN Security Council should periodically monitor the human rights situation 
in Myanmar and propose to adopt feasible options to curtail the ongoing rise of religious 
nationalism in the South Asian and Southeast Asian regions. At the regional level, the 
Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) should create a mandate to work together so that the 
member countries can cooperate with each other in curbing the religious nationalism, to 
diminish the security threats to the region.     
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Chapter 12: Conclusion 
The Myanmar Rohingya conflict has caused an enormous death toll and mass 
human rights violations. If the conflict cannot be resolved soon, a greater human 
catastrophe might occur than what is going on now. On the way to solve the Rohingya 
conflict, all parties must acknowledge the harm caused to the Rohingya community and 
hold them accountable who perpetrated the heinous crime. The most pragmatic approach 
to address the conflict would be to properly analyze every aspect of the conflict from 
each side's perspective. The experiences of the conflict by each side are real and need to 
be acknowledged and addressed accordingly. The Rohingya conflict is the outcome of 
mono-ethnic religious nationalism that surfaced from the prolonged period of 
undemocratic rule. The absence of the democratic norms in any society diminishes the 
social values and destroys the culture of accountability, which has happened in Myanmar. 
The prolonged absence of democratic practices disregard for human rights, and 
the overwhelming influence of religion over the Myanmar society supported the 
xenophobic spirit in Myanmar. Myanmar society often placed the value of religious 
legacy over the citizens. Buddhism was raised to a level above Myanmar national 
identity, where the existence of other religions or faiths is considered as impure and 
undesirable. From such a nationalistic point of view, the Buddhist nationalist leaders 
identified Rohingyas as the significant threat for their religious legacy and accordingly 
unified all other stakeholders to attain a common goal of eliminating the Muslim minority 
Rohingyas. Such an anti-Muslim narrative and huge power asymmetry complicated the 
resolution process of the conflict. More so, due to lack of social mechanisms for 
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accountability of social injustices made both the military and Buddhist majority leaders 
became less respectful about the rights of the minority groups. Again, the absence of 
limited voting rights of the ethnic minority groups made the political parties less caring or 
interested in preserving the rights of ethnic minority groups. 
In the context of systematic, institutionalized discrimination, the scopes for 
intergroup communication became very limited. The immediate and long-term challenge 
is to build trust in the minds of the citizens regarding each other. In such a situation, 
international intervention for meaningful intergroup dialogues and holding the 
government and the military accountable for human rights violations might be useful. 
The appropriate credible interjection by the UN and the international community can 
bring a drastic change in the prevailing situation in Myanmar. However, as long as China 
and the USA support the Myanmar Regime due to their economic interest, it is doubtful 
how far the international community would be able to impose effective sanctions on 
Myanmar. A ray of light can be seen as the UN Security Council in early June 2019, 
urged the member states not to provide any support to Myanmar military to curtail its 
influence on the Myanmar government. Recently, in November 2019, the Gambia, a 
member state of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), took a bold step to draft 
a claim to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Myanmar on the Rohingya 
issue. More and more similar initiatives need to be taken to address the ongoing 
Rohingya crisis, and the international community should rally behind those initiatives to 
ensure the conflict to end. 
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Chapter 13: Implications for Conflict Resolution and Future Research   
There are many important implications of my current study on the Rohingya crisis for 
resolution of the conflict or conflict transformation process. The study has analyzed the 
present socio-political and religious context of Myanmar and the root causes of the 
conflict. The study has following implications for conflict resolution process: 
1. Communication challenges prevailing among the stakeholders, which need 
attention. 
2. Huge power gap exist between the groups involved in the conflict that demands 
dialogue. 
3. Still, Rohingyas are experiencing torture, eviction, and human rights violations in 
the Rakhine state. 
4. Productive dialogues between conflicting groups are required on multiple issues. 
5. Healing of Trauma and Trauma management for the large population of the 
Rohingyas are urgently required. 
6. Effective mediation is required among the groups for an agreement to suspend the 
ongoing human rights violations in Rakhine state. 
7. The storytelling may help people for healing and forgiveness.  
8. There are scopes for international negotiation and mediation for the repatriation of 
the Rohingya refugees. 
The current study has focused on unearthing the root causes of the rise of religious 
nationalism. However, the individualistic perspectives of extremism could not be 
analyzed due to the limited scope of the thesis. Therefore, further research should be 
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conducted on why and how people adopt extremist perceptions? New research should 
also be conducted to identify the factors that can make a society more resilient against 
religious nationalism. 
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Appendix A- Questionnaire for Interview 
 
1. How long you have lived in Myanmar? You are from which part/state of Myanmar? 
2. Which ethnic group do you belong to? 
3. Do you have the citizenship of Myanmar?  
4. Do your father and grandfather have the citizenship of Myanmar?  
5. Have you studied in elementary/high school/college/university? Where have you 
studied, in public or private school? Have you experienced any restriction or challenge 
for your admission to public Scholl/ College/ University? 
6. What is your current profession? Have you ever tried for a government job? Have you 
faced any challenges in applying for a government job? What percent of your community 
members are present in a government job? Is the percentage increase or it has 
decreased? 
7. Do you own any business?   Do you find any challenges or restrictions to do your 
business? What percent of your community members are involved in the business? Is 
the percentage increasing or it is decreasing? 
8. Do you own any land? Have you bought it or you have inherited it? Do you find any 
challenge in managing your property? 
9. Do you own a house, or you live in a rented house in Myanmar? 
10. Have you ever voted in a national election? In the present parliament, how many 
members of Parliament are from your ethnic group? Has it increased or decreased in the 
last 20 years? 
11. Do you face any challenges in expressing your minds in public? Can you travel to places 
freely within or outside of Myanmar? Do you think that you have adequate freedom of 
expression and freedom of movement? If not, why? Who restricts your freedom, and 
how? 
12. Can you practice your religion freely in your locality? Do you face any restriction in 
practicing your religion? Do you anticipate any threat to your religious freedom? 
13. Can you practice/celebrate your culture freely?  
14. Can you freely participate in games and sports? How many members from your 
community could represent the national teams?  
15. What is the state of healthcare in your state compared to other states of Myanmar? Can 
you avail of the public healthcare facility? If not, why and since when? 
16. How is the marriage culture in your community? Is there any restriction in Myanmar on 
cross-cultural or cross-religion marriage? If yes, what is the restriction? Who regulates 
that restriction? Since when the restriction is imposed? 
17. Have you ever experienced arrest/torture/abuse/eviction? If yes by whom, when, and 
why? 
18. What is your opinion about democracy in Myanmar? 
19. What is your opinion about the human rights state in Myanmar? 
20. What you're your opinion about equity and social justice in Myanmar? 
21. What is the development state of your community? Do you think that your community is 
equally developed like other communities of Myanmar?   
22. Do you feel secure while living in Myanmar? 
23. Do you anticipate any threat to your life and human rights? If yes, from whom and why? 
24. Besides your community, is there any other community that are experiencing the similar 
situation of treat and discrimination? 
25. How is the situation in Myanmar?  
26. Who do you think is responsible for the present situation in Myanmar? 
27. What you think are the main reasons for the present situation in Myanmar? 
28. How do you think the international community may help to resolve the present crisis in 
Myanmar? 
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Appendix B- IRB Consent Form 
Form to Participate in Research (No Signature) 
Project Title:  The Rise of Mono Ethnic Religious Nationalism in Myanmar and its 
Impacts on the Security Situation of the South Asian Region. 
Researcher:  S M Anisuz Zaman, Conflict Resolution, Portland State University 
Researcher Contact: smzaman@pdx.edu] / 503-384-8625 
You are being asked to take part in a research study. The box below shows the main facts you need to 
know about this research for you to think about when making a decision about if you want to join in. 
Carefully look over the information in this form and ask questions about anything you do not 
understand before you make your decision. 
 
Key Information for You to Consider 
 Voluntary Consent. You are being asked to volunteer for a research study.  It is up to you 
whether you choose to involve yourself or not.  There is no penalty if you choose not to join 
in or decide to stop. 
 Purpose. The reasons for doing this research are the research is being conducted to identify 
the root causes of the Myanmar Rohingya conflict.  
 Duration. It is expected that your part will last for about 45-60 minutes. 
 Procedures and Activities. You will be asked to answer few questions related to your 
experience in living in Myanmar. 
 Risks. Some of the possible risks or discomforts of taking part in this study include While 
answering my questions you might feel your emotion, you are allowed to take time as long 
as required to manage your emotions. I am a trained trauma manager; I will also help you in 
regulating your emotions.  
 Benefits. Some of the benefits that you may expect include your voices will help in 
understanding the situation that Rohingya people are experiencing, which will help to 
identify the possible resolution pathways. 
 Options. Participation is voluntary and the only alternative is to not participate. 
 
What happens to the information collected?  
Information collected from you for this research will be used to evaluate the prevailing situation in 
Myanmar. The information gather from you will be analyzed and evaluated in a manner that your 
experiences will be highlighted in the research outcome but your identity will not be included.  
 
How will I and my information be protected? 
We will take measures to protect your privacy including maintaining the confidentiality of your 
identifiable information. The appropriate measures will be taken to protect your identity. Your 
names, addresses and contact numbers will not be collected and shared with any other person. 
Despite taking steps to protect your privacy, we can never fully guarantee that your privacy will be 
protected.  
To protect all of your personal information, we will ensure the confidentiality of your identifiable 
information. Your names, addresses and contacts will not be collected and shared with anyone and 
they will not appear in the research outcome. Despite these precautions, we can never fully 
guarantee that all your study information will not be revealed. 
 
 
 
What if I want to stop being in this research? 
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You do not have to take part in this study, but if you do, you may stop at any time. You have the right 
to choose not to join in any study activity or completely stop your participation at any point without 
penalty or loss of benefits you would otherwise get. Your decision whether or not to take part in 
research will not affect your relationship with the researchers or Portland State University. 
 
Will it cost me money to take part in this research? 
There is no cost to taking part in this research, beyond your time. 
 
Will I be paid for taking part in this research? 
No. You will not be paid for taking part in this interview process. 
 
Who can answer my questions about this research? 
If you have questions or concerns, contact the research team at: 
S M Anisuz Zaman 
Cell no- 503-384-8625 
smzaman@pdx.edu 
 
Who can I speak to about my rights as a research participant? 
The Portland State University Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) is overseeing this research. The IRB 
is a group of people who review research studies to  make sure the rights and welfare of the people 
who take part in research are protected. The Office of Research Integrity is the office at Portland 
State University that supports the IRB. If you have questions about your rights, or wish to speak with 
someone other than the research team, you may contact: 
Office of Research Integrity 
PO Box 751 
Portland, OR 97207-0751 
Phone:  (503) 725-5484 
Toll Free:  1 (877) 480-4400 
Email:  hsrrc@pdx.edu   
 
Consent Statement 
I have had the chance to read and think about the information in this form. I have asked any 
questions I have, and I can make a decision about my participation. I understand that I can ask 
additional questions anytime while I take part in the research. 
□ I agree to take part in this study  
□ I do not agree to take part in this study  
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Appendix C- Map of Myanmar 
 
  
Sorce: Available at maps Myanmar: 
https://maps-myanmar.com/myanmar-map-detail 
(Accessed 25June 2019) 
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Appendix D- Map of Rakhine State 
 
 
 
Source: Radio Free Asia. Available at: 
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/violence-10252012182913.html 
 (Accessed 25 June 2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
